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GREEN ETHICS FOR LAWYERS 
TOM LININGER* 
Abstract: The ethical rules for lawyers encourage zealous advocacy on behalf of 
clients, but do not incentivize lawyers to take steps that could minimize harm to 
the environment. This Article proposes a comprehensive set of amendments to 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The goal is to establish not only opportunities, but also obligations, for lawyers to 
promote environmental health. Certain proposals in this Article represent only a 
small extension of the present rules, and deserve consideration for immediate 
adoption, including a proposed liberalization of confidentiality rules to permit 
disclosures in the case of imminent environmental harm, an expansion of law-
yers’ counseling duties, a reconceptualization of third-party harm, an enlarged 
scope of supervisory responsibility, and a redefinition of pro bono service. The 
Article goes on to discuss, without necessarily advocating, some more radical 
ideas for reform. These include a stricter rule against positional conflicts, a more 
lenient standard for evaluating frivolity of environmental claims, a heightened 
obligation of candor with respect to environmental harm, and greater accounta-
bility for environmental damage caused by lawyers and firms. The Article con-
cludes by addressing foreseeable objections to its proposals. One possible prob-
lem is that an expanded whistleblowing duty might alienate clients from their 
counsel, increasing the risk of environmental harm. The Article also considers the 
risk of bifurcating the bar into pro-environment and anti-environment factions. 
Such concerns necessitate caution, but they cannot justify the ABA Model Rules’ 
currently tepid approach to protection of the environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is now common to view environmental protection as an ethical issue. 
According to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “protecting our 
environment is an urgent moral imperative and a sacred duty.”1 Top officials in 
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 1 Press Release, U.N. Sec’y-Gen., Protecting Environment Is ‘an Urgent Moral Imperative’, Sa-
cred Duty for All People of Faith, Secretary-General Tells Vatican Workshop on Climate Change 
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16710.doc.htm [http://perma.cc/7WHW-
2QUT]. 
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the Obama administration speak of a “moral obligation” to reduce carbon 
emissions, a sentiment also expressed by Pope Francis.2 Polling indicates that 
most Americans regard environmental protection as an ethical duty.3 Several 
professional codes, including codes for doctors,4 engineers,5 planners,6 land-
scape architects,7 business executives,8 and officials of nonprofit organiza-
tions,9 include provisions that address the importance of environmental stew-
ardship. 
Remarkably, however, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct do not mention the environment once.10 While 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Gina McCarthy & Kenneth Hackett, Pope Francis’ Call for Climate Action, EPA CONNECT 
(July 13, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2015/07/pope-francis/ [http://perma.cc/5QFH-
TC5M] (referring, on three separate occasions, to a “moral obligation” to reduce pollution). 
 3 Among the 2827 respondents, 66% said that world leaders were morally obligated to address the 
problem of climate change, and 72% said that the respondents themselves were “personally morally 
obligated” to do what they could in their private lives to reduce carbon emissions. Bruce Wallace, 
Most Americans See Combating Climate Change as a Moral Duty, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2015, 1:24 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/27/us-usa-climate-poll-idUSKBN0LV0CV20150227 
[http://perma.cc/DU27-W6YN]. 
 4 WORLD MED. ASSEMBLY, STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF PHYSICIANS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
ISSUES 1 (2006) (“The effective practice of medicine increasingly re quires that physicians and their 
professional associations turn their attention to environmental issues that have a bearing on the health 
of individuals and populations.”). 
 5 CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENG’RS  r. III(2)(d) (NAT’L SOC’Y OF PROF’L ENG’RS 2007) (“Engineers 
are encouraged to adhere to principles of sustainable development in order to protect the environment 
for future generations.”). 
 6 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PLANNERS CODE OF ETHICS & PROF’L CONDUCT r. A(1)(g) (AM. 
PLANNING ASS’N 2009) (“We shall promote excellence of design and endeavor to conserve and pre-
serve the integrity and heritage of the natural and built environment.”). 
 7 See generally CODE OF ENVTL. ETHICS (AM. SOC’Y OF LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS 2006) (setting 
forth detailed obligations of landscape architects to promote environmental health). 
 8 See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, EN-
VIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BUSINESS (2008) (discussing the necessity for businesses to memorialize 
ethical duties relating to environmental protection). 
 9 E.g., ETHICS RULES AND POLICIES OF THE AM. RED CROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
(AM. RED CROSS n.d.). The Red Cross Ethics Rules state that, 
The Red Cross is committed to protecting the environment . . . . The Red Cross requires 
employees and volunteers to participate actively in local environmental programs, fol-
low specified procedures and notify management of situations that are potentially dam-
aging to the environment. We will conserve natural resources and prevent pollution by 
reducing waste, reusing and recycling materials, and disposing of all hazardous and 
other waste in a legal, safe, and responsible manner. 
Id. 
 10 Neither the term “environment” nor any adjectival version of it appears in the black letter text 
of the ABA Model Rules. The word “environmental,” however, does appear three times in the com-
mentary that accompanies the ABA Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 
3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (providing an example of impermissible side-switching when advocating for 
a new client might risk revelation of information provided by a former client); id. r. 5.7 cmt. 9 (men-
tioning “environmental consulting” among thirteen examples of “law-related services” that lawyers 
might perform without being required to follow the ABA Model Rules if lawyers make clear to clients 
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the ABA Model Rules are extremely thorough, and govern matters as picayune 
as handling an errant fax11 or designing a firm’s letterhead,12 the ABA has nev-
er seen fit to address the issue of environmental protection in the rules that 
serve as the boilerplate for state bars throughout the nation. Lawyers in the 
United States continue to operate under a set of ethical rules that the ABA 
adopted in the early 1980s13—an era when environmental protection ranked 
low on this country’s list of priorities.14 
The time has come to remedy the conspicuous omission of environmental 
protection from the list of lawyers’ ethical duties. An effort is underway in Or-
egon—and soon, hopefully, in other states—to elevate the importance of envi-
ronmental issues in the bar’s regulation of lawyers.15 One aspect of the strategy 
                                                                                                                           
that they are not practicing law); id. r. 6.1 cmt. 6 (designating environmental protection to be a sec-
ond-priority category of pro bono). The commentary has less authority than the black letter rules, so 
the discussion of environmental issues in the commentary does not necessarily obligate lawyers to 
protect the environment. (Further, it is interesting to note that the comment to Rule 1.9 criticizes in-
consistent environmental advocacy because of its potential harm to the former human client, not be-
cause of the potential harm to the environment.) 
 11 Model Rule 4.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules provides as follows: “A lawyer who receives a 
document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and 
knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inad-
vertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” Id. r. 4.4(b). 
 12 Model Rule 7.5 of the ABA Model Rules provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that 
violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does 
not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal 
services organization and is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1. 
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name or 
other professional designation in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in 
an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to 
practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located. 
Id. r. 7.5(a)–(b). 
 13 The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, re-
placing a significantly different set of rules known as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 
There have been some occasional amendments since 1983, but the basic structure and substance of the 
rules has remained the same in the following decades. See id. at preface. 
 14 Although the 1970s saw major steps forward in environmental protection—even during the 
presidency of Richard Nixon—the early 1980s saw a retrenchment of business interests and a greater 
ambivalence about environmental protection, particularly to the extent that it might jeopardize the 
government’s attempts to lift the country from an economic recession. See GILBERT LAFRENIERE, 
THE DECLINE OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND THE WESTERN WORLDVIEW 329–30 
(2012). Ronald Reagan was more hostile to the cause of environmental protection than was his prede-
cessor Jimmy Carter. See id. at 329 (“The conservative backlash of the 1980s ‘marked a reversal in 
the move toward environmental protection.’” (quoting BENJAMIN KLINE, FIRST ALONG THE RIVER: A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 101 (2d ed. 2000))). 
 15 The Sustainable Future Section of the Oregon State Bar has undertaken several initiatives to 
improve environmental protection, and is presently attempting to involve the state bar in playing a 
proactive role to help reduce anthropogenic climate change. See Sustainable Future Section, OREGON 
STATE BAR, http://osbsustainablefuture.org/ [http://perma.cc/6W7G-29AW]. The Sustainable Future 
Section of the Oregon State Bar is the first of its kind in the United States, and received the American 
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is to present proposals for revisions of ethical rules, either in the ABA’s tem-
plate or in individual states’ ethical codes. 
This Article suggests amendments that would import “green ethics” to the 
ABA Model Rules. Each of the amendments proposed herein is suitable for 
any of the forty-nine states that have modeled their ethics codes after the ABA 
Model Rules.16 The proposed reforms fit together, and they are also freestand-
ing; the efficacy of any one amendment does not depend on adoption of the 
other amendments. A state could adopt some of the proposed amendments or 
the state might simply revise the commentary accompanying the state’s exist-
ing rules in order to stress the importance of environmental protection. Even in 
a state that declines to revise its rules or commentary, the proposals in this Ar-
ticle might hopefully invite reflection on the ways in which lawyers can act 
voluntarily to protect the environment. 
The dearth of pertinent scholarship requires that this Article must begin 
with first principles.17 Part I begins by exploring the current conceptual 
                                                                                                                           
Bar Association’s State or Local Bar Environment, Energy, and Resources Program of the Year 
Award in 2013. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, Oregon State Bar’s Sustainable Future Section to Re-
ceive 2013 State or Local Bar Environment, Energy, and Resources Program of the Year Award from 
the American Bar Association (July 24, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2013/07/oregon_state_barss.html [http://perma.cc/A7NS-3975]. 
 16 All of the state bars in the United States, except for the California Bar, have adopted the basic 
framework of the ABA Model Rules. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html [http://perma.cc/
2FDS-KS8P]. The bars in the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have also adopted the ABA 
Model Rules. Id. Each state’s code of professional conduct, however, may differ slightly from the 
ABA Model Rules. See Charts Comparing Professional Conduct Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/charts.html [http://perma.cc/G85Z-
92SP] (cataloging the differences between the ABA Model Rules and the various ethics codes of each 
state). 
 17 Virtually no scholarship has focused on the possibility of amending the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to impose duties on all lawyers in order to protect the environment. Some 
scholarship has focused on ethical challenges confronting the subset of attorneys who specialize in the 
practice of environmental law. E.g., J. William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and 
Codes of Professional Responsibility, 27 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 825, 836–39 (1994) (discussing the 
general growth of environmental law as a practice area, and briefly mentioning the need for custom-
ized ethical rules to guide practitioners of environmental law, but offering no specific proposals); 
Stanford M. Stein & Jan M. Geht, Legal Ethics for Environmental Lawyers: Real Problems, New 
Challenges, and Old Values, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 729, 747 (2002) (addressing 
some of the particular problems that environmental lawyers might face, but offering no particular 
solutions to those problems, acknowledging that “[t]his article poses more questions then [sic] it an-
swers”). See generally John French III, Ethical Issues in the Practice of Environmental Law, 2 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 66 (1984) (raising concerns about ethical dilemmas that might arise in the relatively 
new field of environmental law, but offering no blueprint for reforms to address the issues identified). 
Some publications addressing ethical challenges in the context of environmental practice have simply 
explained the application of the current rules rather than urging reform of those rules. See generally 
Pamela Esterman, Environmental Law Practitioner’s Guide to the Model Rules, 25 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 12, 12–15 (2011) (explaining how environmental practitioners can comply with the current 
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framework for the ethical regulation of lawyers.18 Historically, the highest im-
perative in the legal profession has been zealous advocacy on behalf of a law-
yer’s client.19 This goal began to yield somewhat when the ABA’s Ethics 2000 
Commission proposed several reforms permitting—but usually not requiring—
lawyers to address third-party interests distinct from their clients’ priorities.20 
The ABA adopted the Commission’s recommendations and also adopted addi-
tional reforms to permit whistleblowing in the aftermath of the corporate scan-
dals that led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.21 While the 
cognizance of nonpartisan interests in the updated ABA Model Rules is com-
mendable, the fact remains that only human interests provide a basis for dis-
loyalty to a client.22 Environmental considerations standing alone cannot trump 
the duty of partisan advocacy, except to the extent that those considerations 
translate to financial harm or health risks to humans.23 
Next, Part II of this Article sets forth proposals that represent only a small 
departure from the current version of the ABA Model Rules.24 These proposals 
are consistent with the rationale that now underlies many of the Model Rules. 
The proposals simply extend that rationale to incentivize—and in some cases 
require—attention to environmental concerns. Examples of such reforms in-
clude new exceptions to confidentiality requirements, a heightened duty of 
disclosure in evaluations a lawyer creates for use by a third party, an expanded 
duty of client counseling, a wider conception of third-party harm, an extension 
of supervisory liability, a redefinition of pro bono service, a relaxation of the 
conflict rules for service on the boards on nonprofit organizations, and a new 
standard for evaluating conduct that could raise questions about fitness to prac-
tice law.25 
Part III offers ideas for more radical changes.26 Admittedly, these reforms 
are not ready for present inclusion in the ABA Model Rules. The point of rais-
ing these ideas is to provoke a discussion that might eventually lead to pro-
posals suitable for future adoption. Among the ideas discussed in this Part is a 
prohibition of positional conflicts, a new standard for evaluating frivolity of 
claims, a higher duty of candor to the tribunal, a liberalization of the ban on 
                                                                                                                           
rules). All of the above-listed articles did a commendable job addressing the topics they sought to 
address, but none has aspired to provide a comprehensive set of reforms to the ABA Model Rules in 
order to make sure that all lawyers will play a role in protecting the environment. 
 18 See infra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 42–56 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 42–56 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 57–70 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 57–70 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 85–138 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 94–138 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 139–182 and accompanying text. 
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for-profit solicitation, and a systematic evaluation of firms and lawyers based 
on their conduct with respect to the environment.27 
Finally, Part IV addresses foreseeable objections.28 Some critics may ar-
gue that the proposals in this Article go too far, creating a schism between law-
yers and clients, polarizing the bar, and inviting onerous regulation of lawyers 
outside the context of environmental protection.29 On the other end of the spec-
trum, some critics might argue that the proposals offered in this Article do not 
go far enough, relying too heavily on voluntarism and missing opportunities to 
impose more meaningful whistleblowing requirements.30 All of the above-
listed objections deserve attention, but they do not justify inaction. 
In the end, the promise and shortcomings of “green ethics” for lawyers are 
comparable to the benefits and drawbacks of all proposals for environmental 
protection. The market has clearly failed, but the incremental reforms that seem 
innocuous are unlikely to be sufficient, while more potentially efficacious pro-
posals might necessitate an intolerable transformation of the market-based sys-
tem. The best course for the bar may be difficult to discern at present, but one 
thing is clear: lawyers should not sit idly by while other professions earnestly 
take on the challenge of protecting the environment. We must do our part. 
I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ABA MODEL RULES 
For the last several decades, the ABA, embracing the adversary model, 
has presumed that the aggressive interplay of highly partisan, client-centered 
advocates will achieve results approximating justice.31 While this system may 
have performed certain functions well—the allocation of costs between parties, 
the protection of parties’ procedural rights, the efficient disposition of cases—
                                                                                                                           
 27 See infra notes 144–182 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 183–214 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 207–214 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Anthony D’Amato & Edward J. Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
761, 764–70 (1983) (critiquing the “autonomy model” and its emphasis on pursuing the interests of 
clients at the expense of other interests; this model is the “mainstream position of the practicing bar” 
and is the foundation for the ABA Model Rules adopted in 1983); Andrew Pearlman, A Behavioral 
Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 1643 (2015). As one scholar noted, 
Traditionally, the partisanship principle has been understood as one aspect of the domi-
nant view of legal ethics—that lawyers should, “within the established constraints of 
professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the client’s objectives will be at-
tained.” Put more simply, a lawyer should pursue a client’s cause to the full extent the 
law allows. 
Id. (quoting DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 12 (1988)). 
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there can be little doubt that the client-centered paradigm has marginalized the 
importance of extrinsic environmental concerns.32 
A. The Primacy of Partisanship 
Our legal system is unapologetically adversarial. Each lawyer represents 
one interest—that of his or her client—and bears little obligation to attend to 
interests distinct from the client’s interest.33 This approach comports with the 
libertarian philosophy that weighs individual rights more heavily than collec-
tive obligations. Even from a utilitarian perspective, the interplay of aggres-
sive, self-interested actors presumably improves the efficiency of the judicial 
system in the same way it improves the economy.34 The “invisible hand” that 
guides the laissez-faire economy presumably guides the justice system even 
when each individual attorney seeks only to advance the interests of that attor-
ney’s client. 35 
Lord Brougham was an early proponent of the partisan ideal. When King 
George IV of England attempted to divorce his wife because of her alleged 
adultery, Lord Brougham represented the Queen.36 Lord Brougham contem-
plated whether he could ethically defend the Queen by threatening to reveal 
damaging information about the King, to wit, the King’s own adultery and se-
cret marriage to a Catholic. These facts, if known to the English public, threat-
ened to plunge the country into chaos.37 Yet Lord Brougham concluded that the 
threat to reveal this damaging information was not only permissible, but oblig-
                                                                                                                           
 32 E.g., Irma Russell, Unreasonable Risk: Rule 1.6, Environmental Hazards, and Positive Law, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 117, 119 (1998) (noting that “rules of ethics created by the American Bar As-
sociation provide little guidance to the attorney facing the dilemma posed by client secrets that can 
harm third parties,” especially when the client is engaged in conduct that might present the risk of 
environmental harm). 
 33 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 
85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976) (arguing that “it is not only legally but also morally right that a law-
yer adopt as his dominant purpose the furthering of his client’s interests,” and “that it is right that a 
professional put the interests of his client above some idea, however valid, of the collective interest”). 
 34 Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Civil Practitioner: Teaching Legal 
Ethics in the Contracts Course, in EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
LAWYER 151, 151–52 (Donald T. Weckstein ed., 1970) (arguing that the best way to discover the 
truth is for the lawyers of both parties to engage in aggressive partisan advocacy). 
 35 D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 765 (“[T]he ‘invisible hand’ theory, popularized by Ad-
am Smith, [holds] that individual entrepreneurs acting selfishly will nevertheless in the aggregate 
promote maximum economic well-being for all through a competitive market. Thus, by ‘champion-
ing’ a client’s interests ‘against’ society, a lawyer . . . is serving the true interests of society as a 
whole.”). 
 36 Albert Alschuler at the University of Chicago has drawn a parallel between Lord Brougham’s 
advocacy and the tactics used by the defense team in the 1995 prosecution of O.J. Simpson. Albert 
Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the O.J. Simpson 
Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 291–92 (1998). 
 37 Id. 
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atory, because it would advance the interests of his client—the only person to 
whom he owed loyalty.38 
Leading modern scholars extol Lord Brougham’s characterization of law-
yers’ ethical duties. Geoffrey Hazard, a professor at the University of Pennsyl-
vania and the reporter for the ABA Model Rules, described Lord Brougham’s 
bromide as “the classic vindication of the lawyer’s partisan role,” and said that 
“[this] basic narrative has been sustained over two centuries, notwithstanding 
pervasive changes in American society and in the profession itself.”39 Charles 
Fried at Harvard Law School declared that the lawyer must “put the interests 
of his client above some idea, however valid, of the collective interest.”40 
Monroe H. Freedman at Hofstra Law School, recognized among the top schol-
ars of legal ethics, has discussed the value of partisanship in discovering the 
truth, remarking, “[T]he most effective means of determining truth is to place 
upon a skilled advocate for each side the responsibility of investigating and 
presenting the facts from a partisan perspective.”41 
B. An Emerging Cognizance of Nonpartisan Interests 
Consistent with the highly partisan conception of the lawyer’s role, the 
version of the ABA Model Rules adopted in 1983 established few exceptions 
to the overriding duty to promote a client’s interests. One striking example is 
the original version of ABA Model Rule 1.6, which set forth the duty of confi-
dentiality and its exceptions. As originally adopted, Rule 1.6 only included two 
exceptions.42 The strong commitment to confidentiality in the original version 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. Lord Brougham explained: 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and 
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all haz-
ards and costs to other persons, and among them, to himself, is his first and only duty. 
In performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction 
which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advo-
cate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to 
involve his country in confusion. 
Id. (quoting 2 J. NIGHTINGALE, THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821)). 
 39 Geoffrey Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244 (1991). 
 40 Fried, supra note 33, at 1066. 
 41 Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 78–79 
(1998). 
 42 The originally adopted version of ABA Model Rule 1.6 provided as follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the 
client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in 
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely 
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or 
2016] Green Ethics for Lawyers 69 
of the ABA Model Rules followed logically from the notion that client-
centered duties were paramount in lawyers’ ethics.43 
In time, however, the ABA and state bars began to acknowledge that ex-
ceptions to partisanship might be appropriate in limited circumstances. One 
such circumstance is child abuse. By the year 2000, many state legislatures had 
adopted statutes that imposed reporting obligations on various professionals.44 
Lawyers assumed the duty, too, in 2002,45 although the ABA Model Rules and 
their state counterparts generally provided for permissive rather than mandato-
ry disclosure.46 In the context of child abuse, an exception to confidentiality 
seemed appropriate because of the uniquely compelling circumstances: chil-
dren are vulnerable to severe harm, they are defenseless against that harm, they 
are unlikely to report the abuse themselves, and reporting by lawyers could 
expose harm that might otherwise escape notice.47 
                                                                                                                           
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against 
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to alle-
gations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of a client. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2005, at 99–104 (2006) [hereinafter ABA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
When it adopted the original version of Model Rule 1.6, the ABA House of Delegates rejected a rec-
ommendation by the Kutak Commission that would have added two more exceptions: an exception 
for disclosure “to rectify the consequences of the client’s criminal or fraudulent act in furtherance of 
which the lawyer’s services had been used” and an exception for disclosure “to comply with other 
law.” See History—Rule 1.6, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (pre-2002), LEGAL INFO. 
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/2001/history.htm [http://perma.cc/9UMC-GNGK]. 
 43 D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 769 (observing that the “the autonomy model places an 
extremely high value on total confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship”). 
 44 E.g., Robin A. Rosencrantz, Rejecting “Hear No Evil Speak No Evil”: Expanding the Attor-
ney’s Role in Child Abuse Reporting, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 339–45 (briefly summarizing the 
evolution of statutes relating to reporting child abuse). 
 45 The ABA House of Delegates adopted the recommendation of the Ethics 2000 Commission to 
include an exception to confidentiality allowing, but not requiring, lawyers to disclose information 
necessary to “comply with other law or a court order” such as state statutes concerning the reporting 
of child abuse. See Katharyn I. Christian, Student Commentaries, Putting Legal Doctrines to the Test: 
The Inclusion of Attorneys as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 215, 222–25 
(2008) (explaining the evolution of confidentiality exceptions under Rule 1.6 and their effect on law-
yers’ reporting of child abuse). 
 46 Nancy E. Stuart, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 243, 246–54 (1987) (discussing the proliferation of mandatory reporting stat-
utes and explaining that state bars tended to make reporting permissive rather than mandatory); see 
also Christian, supra note 45, at 218–20 (noting that some states made lawyers mandatory reporters of 
child abuse). 
 47 E.g., Rosencrantz, supra note 44, at 329–40 (analyzing the unique circumstances that necessi-
tate imposing a reporting duty on attorneys, including the tremendous risk of harm to children and the 
inability of children to stop the abuse); Stuart, supra note 46, at 245–47 (emphasizing harm, vulnera-
bility, and lack of other means for authorities to gain information about child abuse); Christian, supra 
note 45, at 222 (discussing the rationale for exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in cases involving 
child abuse, and highlighting the vulnerability of children along with the potential gravity of harm). 
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In 2003, the ABA recognized another circumstance that might suspend 
the ordinary duty of loyalty to the client. In the wake of several corporate 
scandals in 2002,48 the ABA House of Delegates established new exceptions to 
Rule 1.6,49 as well as stronger language in Rule 1.13,50 authorizing lawyers to 
act as whistleblowers upon discovering evidence of financial crime or fraud by 
clients (or, in the case of organizational clients, by the clients’ employees). 
While the amendments included conditions that made disclosure unlikely,51 
they signaled a further erosion of the loyalty required in the original version of 
the ABA Model Rules. The reforms of 2003 followed shortly after Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposed reporting duties on account-
ants and lawyers who discovered evidence of fraud by clients.52 The disclosure 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Susan Koniak, a law professor at Columbia Law School, has written a detailed account of law-
yers’ complicity in the Enron scandal. Susan Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Strug-
gle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1239–43 (2003); see also Scott Harshbarger & Goutam 
Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 
40 AKRON L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2007) (excerpting a speech by Scott Harshbarger, former Attorney Gen-
eral of Massachusetts). Harshbarger stated, 
[W]hat also leaps out at me is that in nearly every single transaction at WorldCom, En-
ron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, Qwest, and any of the other leading examples of 
serious corporate problems involving crime, fraud, schemes, and malfeasance, in all 
those cases, there was a lawyer who, at some level, saw, heard, reviewed, analyzed, and 
billed for legal services rendered. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott Harshbarger, Strengthening Democracy: The Challenge of 
Public Interest Law, 56 ME. L. REV. 211, 221 (2004)). 
 49 In 2001, the ABA House of Delegates adopted many of the reforms proposed by the Ethics 
2000 Commission, but declined to adopt the proposed exceptions to confidentiality for ongoing or 
past client fraud involving the lawyers’ services. E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and 
Ethics in a Post Enron/Worldcom Environment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 731, 737–38 (2003). The Enron 
scandal provided the impetus for the ABA to adopt those two amendments in 2003. See id. at 737. For 
the text of ABA Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3), see infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.  
 50 Lawrence Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the 2003 Chang-
es to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 35, 40–47 (2003) 
(explaining the evolution of the 2003 amendments to ABA Model Rule 1.13, which sought to increase 
the efficacy of whistleblowing provisions relating to fraud and other malfeasance by constituents of 
organizational clients). 
 51 For example, amended Rules 1.6(b)(2), 1.6(b)(3), and 1.13 indicate that disclosure and/or whis-
tleblowing will only be permissible as to matters relating to the lawyers’ services or representation of 
a client—a limitation that might make lawyers more reluctant to report for fear of exposing their own 
misconduct or negligence—as opposed to authorizing lawyers to disclose fraudulent conduct in which 
the lawyers had no involvement. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.6(b)(2)–(3), 1.13. 
 52 Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC to adopt rules 
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and 
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including 
a rule—(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities 
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent there-
of, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the 
equivalent thereof); and (2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to 
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rules for fraud, like the disclosure rules for child abuse, seem to rest on a ra-
tionale of exceptional urgency: when lawyers have access to what is otherwise 
nonpublic information, lawyers should speak up in order to avoid significant 
harm to vulnerable third parties.53 
The ABA continues to consider the possibility of adding new duties to re-
duce harm to third parties. The latest example is a proposed amendment to 
ABA Model Rule 8.4 that would require lawyers to refrain from speech or 
conduct that would show disrespect for third persons on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, marital status, or socioeconomic status.54 A total of twenty-four state 
bars have already adopted a similar requirement.55 The rationale seems to be 
that lawyers need to avoid causing harm to the above-listed groups, many of 
which are vulnerable because of historical mistreatment and prejudice, even if 
such harm might be advantageous to the lawyers’ clients. 56 
C. Lingering Anthropocentrism 
In theory, at least, the principle of minimizing collateral harm could ex-
tend to nonhuman environmental interests. But the ABA Model Rules have 
remained anthropocentric since their passage in 1983.57 No black letter rule58 
                                                                                                                           
the evidence . . . requiring the attorney to report the evidence . . . to the board of direc-
tors . . . . 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7245 (2012)). 
 53 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.6(b)(2)–(3), 1.13. 
 54 The amendment would change Model Rule 8.4 to read, in pertinent part, as follows: “It is pro-
fessional misconduct for a lawyer to: (g) knowingly harass or discriminate against persons, on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identi-
ty, marital status or socioeconomic status, while engaged in [conduct related to] [in] the practice of 
law.” ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Amendment to Model Rule 8.4 and 
Comment [3], at 1 (July 5, 2015) (working discussion draft) (alteration in original), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/draft_07082015.auth
checkdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/QH8L-WRR5]. 
 55 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Revisions to Model Rule 8.4 Lan-
guage Choice Narrative 1 (July 16, 2015) (working discussion draft), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/language_choice_narrative_with_appen-
dices_final.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/FKV3-69X4]. 
 56 Id. at 3–5 (stressing that members of these groups deserve to be treated with “dignity and re-
spect,” even though the proposed rule might constrain lawyers’ freedom of expression). 
 57 Anthropocentrism is the notion that human interests take precedence over nonhuman interests. 
See THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 56 (2d Am. ed. 2003); see also Elizabeth 
Dodson Gray, Come Inside the Circle of Creation, in ETHICS & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THEORY 
MEETS PRACTICE 25 (1994) (“This anthropocentric illusion about the human species and our place on 
planet Earth has unfortunately been the basis of Western science and technology. We never ask 
whether a particular invention or scientific advance fits in, because we have conceptualized ourselves 
as above, never as within.”). 
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in the ABA Model Rules has ever mentioned the environment or nonhuman 
interests.59 The commentary to the Rules also focuses almost exclusively on 
human interests.60 The Rules insist that lawyers must advocate zealously on 
behalf of their clients except when such advocacy might jeopardize an extrin-
sic human interest, for example, by risking physical or financial harm to hu-
mans.61 Although advocates for the biotic and abiotic environment have strug-
gled mightily to gain standing in court,62 the ABA Model Rules continue to 
regard nonhuman environmental interests as virtually irrelevant to lawyers’ 
ethical duties.63 
There are several reasons for this anthropocentrism. First, the ABA House 
of Delegates adopted the Model Rules in the early 1980s, when environmental 
advocacy was a relatively low priority in this country.64 The revisions to the 
                                                                                                                           
 58 In this context, the term “black letter” refers to the language of the rule itself, as opposed to the 
commentary and other interpretive notes. E.g., Charles Sivler & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The 
Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1474 (1998) 
(using the term “black letter” to refer to the express language of a particular rule in the ABA Model 
Rules, as opposed to interpretative authority). 
 59 Supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of references to the environment 
in the text of the Model Rules). 
 60 The commentary only refers to the environment three times, and two of these references are 
noteworthy for their subordination of environmental interests to human interests. Supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
 61 For example, the grounds for whistleblowing pursuant to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 relate to 
harm that could befall third parties who are human, and the third-party harm addressed in Model Rule 
4.4(a) seems to be human as well. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.6, 4.4(a), 1.13. 
 62 Steven Wise offers a provocative argument for animal rights and, ultimately, animal standing. 
E.g., Steven Wise, Nonhuman Rights to Personhood, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1278, 1280–84 (2013) 
(laying out a conceptual basis for extending personhood and legal rights to animals). Wise and his 
colleagues at the Nonhuman Rights Project have made important strides toward the goal of establish-
ing standing for nonhuman creatures. On July 30, 2015, they failed to persuade a New York court to 
extend habeas corpus rights to chimpanzees held on the State University of New York’s Albany cam-
pus, but the court acknowledged that such an argument might one day have merit. In re Nonhuman 
Rights Project ex rel. Hercules v. Stanley, No. 152736/2015, 2015 BL 252279, at *19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
July 29, 2015) (indicating that “[e]fforts to extend legal rights to chimpanzees are . . . understandable; 
some day they may even succeed”). 
 63 Jedediah Purdy, a professor at Duke Law School, has made a compelling argument against 
anthropocentrism in general ethics, although his work has not focused particularly on the rules of 
professional conduct for lawyers. In particular, he has inveighed against the conception that environ-
mental protection only matters to the extent that it is instrumentally valuable to humans. Jedediah 
Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 
857, 871–74 (2013); see Misha Mitchell, Cries from the Cafos: A Case for Environmental Ethics, 39 
J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 68 (2014) (“Today, the field of environmental law is primarily normative in nature 
and dependent on the utilization of cost-benefit analysis to determine the value of the natural world to 
our anthropocentric needs.”). 
 64 Supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of progress on environmental con-
cerns in the 1980s). 
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ABA Model Rules since 1983 have mostly involved fine-tuning.65 It is not sur-
prising that an ethics code born in the Reagan era would accord little attention 
to environmental protection. 
Second, the notion that lawyers should consider nonhuman interests pos-
es practical difficulties. How can lawyers gauge such interests? While the 
concerns of humans are easy to discern, the nonhuman environment cannot 
communicate with lawyers, and there is no easy way to assess what a nonhu-
man creature is thinking or feeling.66 Disagreements sometimes arise about 
the occurrence or extent of environmental harm. For example, despite the 
mounting evidence of anthropogenic climate change, there remains a striking 
lack of consensus on this matter among people who lack scientific expertise.67 
Most lawyers are not professional scientists. Without specialized scientific 
knowledge, lawyers have been more comfortable with an anthropocentric ori-
entation in their ethical code. 
Third, the downturn in the U.S. legal economy over the last ten years has 
reduced interest in amendments to the ethical rules that might impose addition-
al economic burdens on lawyers.68 If lawyers could lose business or face extra 
costs as a result of new duties to nonhuman interests, such duties might seem 
an ill fit during a time of austerity in the legal market.69 Zealous partisanship, 
and an exclusive focus on human interests, has seemed to align better with 
lawyers’ economic interests.70 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Supra note 13 and accompanying text; see ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, LEGAL 
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/ [http://perma.cc/SV5Y-6E7X] (providing a com-
parison of the 2013 version of the Model Rules with the 1983 version). 
 66 But see Cass Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 400 (2003) (arguing that 
science could eventually do a better job of discerning the interests of nonhumans, or at least attempt-
ing to assess the suffering of animals; suggesting that the difficulty of discerning animals’ interests 
should not justify the continuation of ancient prejudice against animals). 
 67 See generally JENNIFER R. MARLON ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, 
SCIENTIFIC AND PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2013), http://environment.yale.edu/
climate-communication/article/scientific-and-public-perspectives-on-climate-change [http://perma.cc/
DU5T-JZLC] (noting that while the vast majority of the scientific community has recognized an an-
thropogenic role in causing climate change, only 41% of the American public agrees). 
 68 In fact, the recent trend has been to reduce ethical constraints so that lawyers can seek addi-
tional business opportunities. One example is the 2009 amendment to Rule 1.10 relaxing the imputa-
tion of conflicts arising from an associate’s representation of conflicting private interests. See Erik 
Wittman, A Discussion of Nonconsensual Screens as the ABA Votes to Amend Model Rule 1.10, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1211, 1226–27 (2009) (observing that economic considerations provided part 
of the rationale for liberalizing imputation under Rule 1.10). 
 69 Cf. Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. REV. 515, 518–23 
(1996) (generally discussing the interrelationship between law firm economics and the bar’s approach 
to duties of professionalism). 
 70 D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 769 (noting that the highly partisan paradigm “seems to 
be in the best economic self-interest of lawyers”). 
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D. The Case for a Duty of Environmental Protection 
Notwithstanding the above-listed reasons—perhaps better characterized 
as rationalizations—for the present disregard of nonhuman interests, there are 
strong reasons to add environmental considerations to lawyers’ ethical duties. 
Indeed, environmental interests are similar to the third-party interests that law-
yers must presently consider.71 The environment is analogous to an abused 
child who is defenseless to protect against that abuse, and who is incapable of 
summoning aid without the assistance of the lawyer.72 The environment is also 
analogous to the pensioners and investors who are protected from client fraud 
by amended Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13; while they stand to suffer catastrophic 
losses if the fraud occurs, they have no means of protecting themselves against 
it, and they would benefit if conscientious lawyers could help them avert the 
harm before it spirals out of control.73 Environmental protection is arguably 
just as urgent as the harm to third parties’ dignitary interests, which the ABA 
seeks to avert with the proposed amendment to Rule 8.4 (although, of course, 
there is no reason to pit environmental protection against protection of human 
groups that have suffered discrimination).74 The ABA has begun to recognize 
that duties to avoid collateral harm make sense in many contexts, especially 
when lawyers are uniquely situated to prevent such harm,75 and it is but a small 
extension of this philosophy to accord similar concern to environmental pro-
tection. 
The anthropocentric orientation of legal ethics no longer provides a rea-
son to ignore environmental protection. To the contrary, modern science has 
shown that environmental harm threatens human health. For example, studies 
indicate that climate change causes over 100,000 human deaths each year.76 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.6, 1.13. 
 72 Supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (discussing reporting requirements for lawyers who 
are aware of child abuse). 
 73 Supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing reporting requirements for lawyers who 
are aware of a client’s fraud involving the financial interests of a third party). 
 74 Supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (discussing a proposed amendment to Model Rule 
8.4). 
 75 For example, ABA Model Rule 8.3(a) imposes a duty on lawyers to report certain categories of 
misconduct by other lawyers: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trust-
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authori-
ty.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3. The justification for this reporting duty seems to rest, 
at least in part, on a lawyer’s unique ability to discern such misconduct and report it without fear of 
reprisal by the respondents. 
 76 The Climate Vulnerability Monitor, a study commissioned by twenty of the world’s govern-
ments whose nations are most threatened by climate change, indicated that 400,000 annual deaths are 
attributable to anthropogenic climate change. See generally DEV. ASSISTANCE RESEARCH ASSOCS., 
CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR: A GUIDE TO THE COLD CALCULUS OF A HOT PLANET (2d ed. 
2012), http://www.daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CVM2ndEd-FrontMatter.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/GU4M-RDE8] (reporting findings of fifty scientists and policy experts from around the world). 
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The very first version of the ABA Model Rules recognized the need for disclo-
sure to avoid “death or substantial bodily injury.”77 While environmental pro-
tection does not fit easily within the early exceptions to confidentiality, the du-
ty to protect the environment is a logical extension of these early exceptions. 
Even from the dispassionate vantage point of economics, the need for 
lawyers to protect the environment is manifest. American economists generally 
prefer to let the market operate freely, but they recognize the need for regula-
tion when there is a market failure. 78 Scholars of legal ethics have noted the 
predominance of a laissez-faire, market-oriented approach, but they too recog-
nize the need for regulation when the “invisible hand” cannot adequately ad-
dress harmful externalities.79 Pollution and other environmental harms are the 
sorts of externalities that economists would generally regard as providing 
strong grounds to depart from a laissez-faire approach.80 
Another reason for lawyers to accept environmental responsibilities is to 
keep up with similar professions that are assuming such duties. When doctors, 
engineers, business executives, and a wide range of other professionals are 
embracing their ethical obligation to protect the environment, 81 the failure of 
lawyers to do so is conspicuous. This contrast portends more significant prob-
lems than mere shame for lawyers. The legal profession enjoys a valuable qua-
si-monopoly82 and the right of self-regulation due to the forbearance of state 
                                                                                                                           
Ten years ago, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) estimated that climate change caused ap-
proximately 150,000 human deaths and five million human illnesses per year. Juliet Ellperin, Climate 
Shift Tied to 150,000 Fatalities, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602197.html [http://perma.cc/R9LF-PZWK] (reporting 
findings by WHO, which predicted that the toll could double by the year 2030). 
 77 The original version of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) only allowed disclosure of a “criminal act . . . 
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” ABA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 42, at 102. The current version of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) has extended this language to cover non-
criminal acts and to transform the requirement of temporal proximity to one of reasonable certainty. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1); infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 78 E.g., DIRK MATEER & LEE COPPOCK, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 212–19 (2013) (dis-
cussing the U.S. government’s general response to market failure). 
 79 D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 768–69 (recognizing that the economic principles of 
Adam Smith, and the notion of the “invisible hand,” underlie the current approach to legal ethics, but 
pointing out that even in the nineteenth century, regulators abandoned the “invisible hand” to protect 
against harms caused by the uninhibited pursuit of selfish economic interests). 
 80 Paul Krugman, an economics professor at Princeton and a regular columnist in the New York 
Times, has explained that, “Externalities like pollution are one of the classic forms of market failure, 
and Econ 101 says that this failure should be remedied through [government regulation].” Paul 
Krugman, Markets Can Be Very, Very Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://
krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/markets-can-be-very-very-wrong/ [http://perma.cc/F2L9-
MY6B]. 
 81 Supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text (noting that other professions have incorporated envi-
ronmental protection into their ethical codes). 
 82 Technically, lawyers do not have a monopoly over the practice of law because laypeople can 
represent themselves pro se, but lawyers have a quasi-monopoly in the sense that it is difficult for 
laypeople to provide legal representation of others. See David McGowan, Is There a Utilitarian Case 
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supreme courts and legislatures,83 but the justices and legislators who have 
tolerated lawyers’ autonomy in the past may grow frustrated with it when law-
yers lag behind other professions in taking action to address environmental 
harm. Perhaps lawyers’ refusal to protect the environment could lead state su-
preme courts and state legislatures to reconsider whether lawyers deserve to 
regulate themselves. 84 
II. PROPOSALS FOR NEAR-TERM REFORMS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES 
Some proposals to reform the ABA Model Rules are appropriate for im-
mediate adoption. These proposals entail only a modest extension of duties 
that exist in the Rules already. Section A proposes a change to Rule 1.6 in or-
der to permit revelation of imminent environmental harm.85 Section B recom-
mends clarifying lawyers’ counseling duties with respect to environmental 
matters.86 Section C then calls for a higher duty of candor in evaluations law-
yers create for use by third parties.87 Section D continues by proposing a duty 
to minimize pollution, waste and other environmental harms that are incidental 
to lawyers’ day-to-day activities.88 Next, section E suggests new training obli-
gations for lawyers with supervisory duties.89 Section F recommends a re-
definition of pro bono service to include work on environmental causes.90 Sec-
tion G proposes new conflicts rules for lawyers serving on the boards of envi-
ronmental advocacy groups.91 Finally, section H calls for changes to the catch-
all rules governing lawyers’ conduct outside of their professional activities.92  
                                                                                                                           
for Mandatory Pro Bono?, LEGAL ETHICS F. (Apr. 19, 2007, 2:52 PM), http://www.legalethicsforum.
com/blog/2007/04/mandatory_pro_b.html [http://perma.cc/GPS9-FBNN] (arguing that lawyers do not 
have a monopoly over the practice of law). 
 83 State supreme courts and state legislatures have the power to regulate lawyers or to let lawyers 
regulate themselves. In addition, both have the power to forbid the unauthorized practice of law and to 
enforce that prohibition. Thus state supreme courts and legislatures have the discretion to continue or 
limit the autonomy of the legal profession. See Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What 
Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3080–83 (2014) (describing the ways in which 
state supreme courts and state legislatures could, and currently do, regulate lawyers). 
 84 Cf. Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2611 (2014) (“The U.S. legal profession’s so-called monopoly on the prac-
tice of law is under siege. . . . In some ways, the surprise is not that the monopoly is eroding, but ra-
ther, that it has taken so long.”). 
 85 See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 103–109 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
 88 See infra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 117–119 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 120–127 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
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A. New Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality (Rule 1.6) 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 1.693 to read as follows94: 
Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclo-
sure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation 
or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of 
a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to disclose the intention of the lawyer’s client to commit a crime 
and the information necessary to prevent the crime; 
(2) (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm; 
(3) to prevent imminent, substantial and irremediable environmental 
damage; 
(4) (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial in-
terests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client 
has used or is using the lawyer’s services; 
(5) (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the finan-
cial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to re-
sult or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud 
in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; 
(6) (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with 
these Rules;  
(7) (5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense 
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon 
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of 
the client; 
(8) (6) to comply with other law or a court order; or 
(9) (7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the 
lawyer’s change of employment or from changes in the composition 
or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would 
not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice 
the client. 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 94 Following convention in legislative drafting, this Article will show proposed additions with 
underlining and proposed deletions with overstriking. 
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(c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent 
or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information 
relating to the representation of a client.  
The proposed amendments to Rule 1.6 would provide new opportunities 
for lawyers to disclose client information in order to prevent ongoing or future 
environmental harm. While the new version of Rule 1.6 would not treat envi-
ronmental harm identically to human harm, the amendments would improve 
the present version in two significant ways. 
First, the new Rule 1.6(b)(1) would follow an approach adopted in many 
states that allows lawyers to reveal client information where necessary to pre-
vent the commission of any crime, even a misdemeanor. 95 States are adding 
new environmental crimes to their statute books every year,96 and when a leg-
islature has expressed its judgment that environmental harm is so grave as to 
warrant a criminal sanction, lawyers should not need to second-guess the ur-
gency of that harm in evaluating whether disclosure is appropriate. Some envi-
ronmental crimes do not threaten human health, so the new version of Rule 
1.6(b)(1) would ensure that lawyers are able to report any imminent criminal 
act by a client that could harm the environment. The new version of Rule 
1.6(b)(1) would apply to all crimes, not just environmental crimes, because 
there is no principled reason to single out environmental crimes for special 
treatment under the confidentiality rule. 
Second, the new version of Rule 1.6(b)(3) would add a mechanism for re-
porting noncriminal environmental damage that is “imminent, substantial and 
irremediable.” The ABA has already recognized that the risk of noncriminal 
collateral harm to humans should provide a basis for disclosure;97 the proposed 
Rule 1.6(b)(3) would extend that same reasoning to noncriminal environmental 
harm. Just as the current Rule 1.6(b)(1) limits reporting to the most urgent sub-
set of harm to human health—“reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm”—the proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3) limits reporting to the most urgent subset 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See generally CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, VARIATIONS OF THE 
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_6.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/EB5N-
ZZA6] (comparing state bars’ disclosure grounds under their various analogs to ABA Model Rule 
1.6(b)). 
 96 Energy and Environmental Database, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 9, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/energy-environment-legislation-tracking-database.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/C7PE-BUTQ] (providing a searchable database of new state legislation related to the 
environment). 
 97 The original version of ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) only permitted disclosure of criminal acts 
that were “likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” ABA LEGISLATIVE HISTO-
RY, supra note 42, at 99–104. The current version of ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) extends the excep-
tion to cover both criminal and noncriminal acts that are “reasonably certain” to cause death or sub-
stantial bodily harm. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1). 
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of environmental harm. Of course, it will not always be easy to discern when a 
course of conduct might result in environmental damage that is “imminent, 
substantial and irremediable,” but lawyers need to make such judgment calls in 
other contexts, such as the risk of future physical and financial harm to human 
third parties, and there is no reason to believe that the necessity for speculation 
will be uniquely onerous in the context of environmental harm. Continuing 
legal education programs could improve lawyers’ ability to recognize immi-
nent and serious environmental risks. Further, illustrations in the commentary 
to new Rule 1.6(b)(3) could provide helpful guidance to lawyers.98  
Some might ask why it is insufficient to rely on lawyers to persuade cli-
ents to report environmental risks voluntarily, instead of amending the Model 
Rules. The answer is that many clients presented with this choice would 
choose not to report, especially if aware that lawyers had no independent abil-
ity to hold clients accountable.99 By contrast, if lawyers were able to inform 
clients that lawyers’ ethical rules require disclosure of serious environmental 
harm, clients might self-report more often.100 
Admittedly, some lawyers might feel uncomfortable playing the role of 
environmental whistleblower. But it is important to bear in mind that all the 
disclosure grounds under Rule 1.6(b), including the proposals set forth in this 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Examples of client conduct warranting disclosure might include the following: (1) a client 
planning to develop land in another country intends to eradicate habitat and thereby risk extinction of 
a species; (2) a client intends to deplete a nonrenewable resource in the United States; or (3) a client 
intends to market a chemical despite in-house studies predicting devastation of certain wildlife popu-
lations not protected under the Endangered Species Act. 
 99 Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Environmental Ethics in an Era of Fiscal Austerity, SB52 ALI-ABA 
749, 752 (1997). In fact, 
Environmental lawyers are frequently confronted with the situation in which a client is 
unwilling to report an environmental incident or in which the lawyer believes the client 
is either morally or legally required to report. The obvious solution to this problem is, 
of course, for the lawyer to try to convince the client to report . . . . Nonetheless, despite 
the best efforts of certain lawyers, some clients will err on the side of not reporting. 
Id. 
 100 At a minimum, the addition of environmental harm to the list of consequences permitting 
disclosures affords the lawyer a stronger bargaining position in negotiations with a client contemplat-
ing an environmentally destructive course of conduct. Admittedly, a requirement of mandatory disclo-
sure would go too far, leaving the lawyer only two extreme options: obtain the client’s full compliance 
in halting all dangerous behavior, or disclose otherwise-confidential information. A permissive rule, 
however, allows the lawyer to negotiate for, and accept, a compromise solution with the client. See 
Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 484 
(2006). As one scholar explained, 
[A] lawyer who threatens to disclose because an ethics rule says she must should not be 
able to be persuaded to forego disclosure on any basis other than that the client will cor-
rect the problem to the lawyer’s satisfaction. If the rule is discretionary, however, the 
lawyer arguably is authorized to accept a compromise solution . . . . 
Id. 
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Article, are permissive rather than mandatory. In other words, Rule 1.6(b) does 
not require a lawyer to disclose when one of the circumstances identified under 
Rule 1.6(b) arises. The possibility of third-party suits may create added pres-
sure when lawyers are aware that a client could harm humans,101 but such pres-
sure would be much lower in the context of environmental harm due to limita-
tions on nonhuman standing.102 In sum, this Article’s proposed modifications 
to Rule 1.6(b) would equip conscientious lawyers to report imminent environ-
mental harm, but would not create any new obligations for lawyers who are 
reluctant to play that role. 
B. Expanded Duty of Counseling (Rules 2.1 and 2.2) 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 2.1103 to read as follows: 
Rule 2.1: Advisor 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent profes-
sional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social, and political, and environmental factors, 
that may be relevant to the client’s situation. 
In addition, the following language should appear in ABA Model Rule 2.2, 
which is presently just a placeholder with no text: 
Rule 2.2: Counseling Regarding Environmental Risks 
When a lawyer has knowledge that the lawyer’s client is engaged, 
has engaged, or plans to engage in a course of conduct that is likely 
to result in imminent, substantial and irremediable environmental 
damage, the lawyer shall promptly inform the client of this risk and 
of any alternative courses of action that could avoid or significantly 
mitigate the risk. The client’s unwillingness to pay for such counsel-
ing shall not relieve the lawyer of the obligation to provide at least a 
brief written statement to the client in compliance with this Rule.  
The two proposed changes would improve environmental counseling in 
two ways. First, the proposed amendment to Rule 2.1 would make clear that 
lawyers may bring up environmental considerations in their counseling of cli-
ents. To be sure, the present version of Rule 2.1 might very well allow lawyers 
to voice their environmental concerns under the rubric of “moral,” “social,” or 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (holding that men-
tal health professionals have a duty to protect third parties whom a client has indicated he may immi-
nently harm). 
 102 Wise, supra note 62, at 1280–84. 
 103 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1. 
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“political” considerations, but the express inclusion of environmental issues 
among the list of permissible topics for counseling would increase the likeli-
hood that such issues are on the checklist of every lawyer who counsels a cli-
ent. 
The more significant change is the addition of proposed Rule 2.2. Inter-
estingly, this new rule would occupy a void resulting from the deletion of for-
mer Rule 2.2, which regulated lawyers who acted as intermediaries between 
their clients and third parties.104 The ABA deleted that version of Rule 2.2 be-
cause it did not comport with the longstanding ideal of loyalty to a single cli-
ent.105 Now that the ABA has begun to reduce its insistence on partisanship,106 
it is fitting to restore a version of Rule 2.2 that takes account of extrinsic duties 
to the environment. 
The new Rule 2.2 would require that lawyers counsel their clients con-
cerning a course of conduct likely to result in imminent, substantial and irre-
mediable environmental harm. The imposition of such a counseling duty 
would make sense if the ABA were to adopt the proposed version of Rule 
1.6(b)(3), which would allow lawyers to disclose client information in order to 
prevent this category of environmental harm. Stated another way, the rules 
should require lawyers to give fair warning to their clients before lawyers dis-
close client information.  
Some critics of the proposal might protest the asymmetry between man-
datory discussions under Rule 2.2 and permissive disclosure under Rule 
1.6(b)(3), but the same asymmetry now exists for lawyers representing organi-
zational clients under Rule 1.13. These lawyers have a mandatory duty to re-
port evidence of certain misconduct to supervisory personnel within the organ-
ization, but Rule 1.13 makes external disclosure permissive rather than manda-
tory.107 The proposed Rule 2.2 may seem unusually burdensome in that it re-
                                                                                                                           
 104 The former version of Rule 2.2 set forth the duties of a lawyer acting as an intermediary be-
tween clients. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 65 (providing the text of 
former Rule 2.2). 
 105 ETHICS 2000 COMM’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL RULE 2.2 REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF 
CHANGES, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_
2000_commission/e2k_rule22rem.html [http://perma.cc/63QW-A5S7] (recommending deletion of 
ABA Model Rule 2.2 because lawyers’ duties of loyalty to clients fit better under partisan rules such 
as 1.7). 
 106 Supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text (discussing the ABA’s changing view of a lawyer’s 
roles as a partisan). 
 107 Model Rule 1.13 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person as-
sociated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a 
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organi-
zation, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and 
that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall pro-
ceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the law-
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quires lawyers to counsel clients about environmental harm even if the clients 
refuse to pay for that counseling, but the same type of discussions are neces-
sary under Rule 1.13, even when organizational clients have fired their law-
yers.108 In any event, counseling about environmental harm could take the form 
of a letter based on a template supplied by the ABA, so the task would not en-
tail a significant commitment of a lawyer’s time.109 
C. Heightened Candor in an Evaluation for Use by a Third Party (Rule 2.3) 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 2.3110 as follows: 
Rule 2.3: Evaluation for Use by Third Persons 
(a) A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client 
for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably 
believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects 
of the lawyer’s relationship with the client. 
(b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
evaluation is likely to affect the client’s interests materially and ad-
versely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client 
gives informed consent. 
                                                                                                                           
yer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to 
do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, includ-
ing, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of 
the organization as determined by applicable law. 
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if 
(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority 
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and 
appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating 
to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to 
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the 
organization. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b)–(c). 
 108 Model Rule 1.13(e) provides as follows: 
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the 
lawyer’s actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under cir-
cumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those para-
graphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the or-
ganization’s highest authority is informed of the lawyer’s discharge or withdrawal. 
Id. r. 1.13(e). 
 109 E.g., Center for Professional Responsibility, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility.html [http://perma.cc/AVE5-HWTQ] (providing various resources 
for practitioners); see also LP Forms Bank, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
law_practice/resources/forms_bank.html [http://perma.cc/2W4U-HUHJ] (selling forms and templates 
for use in legal practice). 
 110 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.3. 
2016] Green Ethics for Lawyers 83 
(c) Except as disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of 
an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6. 
(d) When a lawyer provides an evaluation for use by a third person, 
all representations in such an evaluation concerning the occurrence 
or potential occurrence of environmental harm shall be deemed ma-
terial for purposes of Rule 4.1. 
In its present form, Rule 2.3 is highly partisan. The rule stresses the duties 
that the lawyer owes to the client paying for the evaluation, but the rule impos-
es no duties with respect to the audience for the evaluation. In many cases, the 
default duties owed to the audience are simply those set forth in the notorious-
ly permissive Rule 4.1, which forbids deceit as to “material” matters.111 The 
commentary to 4.1 exempts from the definition of “material” any statement 
regarding the value of something under negotiation.112 In sum, the present ver-
sion of Rule 2.3 imposes a high duty of loyalty to the client for the report, and 
a low duty of candor to the third party reading the report. 
The partisanship reflected in the current Rule 2.3 is problematic with re-
spect to evaluations regarding the potential for environmental contamination. 
For example, if a corporation is selling former industrial land to a party with 
more limited resources, the seller might prepare a report indicating that the site 
has high value. Because estimates of value are per se immaterial under Rule 
4.1,113 the lawyer authoring the report arguably would not violate the current 
version of Rule 2.3 even if the report underestimated the risk of environmental 
contamination. The unwary buyer would bear cleanup costs under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Model Rule 4.1, titled “Truthfulness in Statements to Others,” provides as follows: 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 
1.6. 
Id. r. 4.1. 
 112 Comment 2 to Model Rule 4.1 provides as follows: 
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regard-
ed as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conven-
tions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of 
material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a 
party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this catego-
ry, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the 
principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under 
applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation. 
Id. r. 4.1 cmt. 2. 
 113 Id. r. 4.1. 
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(“CERCLA”) and might very well go bankrupt,114 which could delay or even 
thwart remediation of the environmental contamination at the property. 
The proposed amendment to Rule 2.3 would necessitate heightened care 
by lawyers otherwise tempted to neglect or minimize the disclosure of envi-
ronmental harm in reports to third parties. The revised version of Rule 2.3 
would also make clear that all representations relating to environmental harm 
are necessarily material and are therefore subject to the candor requirements 
in Rule 4.1. Currently, a lawyer who purposefully makes a false or misleading 
statement pertaining to environmental contamination would be able to raise 
the defense that reasonable people do not ordinarily rely on such statements. 
To the contrary, the new rule would provide that reliance on lawyers’ repre-
sentations concerning environmental harm is reasonable. 
D. Reconceptualization of Third-Party Harm (Rule 4.4) 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 4.4115 to read as follows: 
Rule 4.4: Respect for the Environment and for the Rights of Third 
Persons 
(a) A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that entails the consump-
tion of resources, the generation of waste, the discharge of pollution 
or any other degradation of the environment in a manner that is 
grossly disproportionate to the importance of the conduct in advanc-
ing a client’s interests or otherwise promoting the interests of jus-
tice. 
(b) (a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that 
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or bur-
den a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate 
the legal rights of such a person. 
(c) (b) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored 
information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and 
knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronical-
ly stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify 
the sender. 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675). Kathleen Segerson at 
the University of Connecticut has pointed out that, under CERCLA, any owner of contaminated prop-
erty, including the most recent purchaser, could potentially be required to bear all the costs of remedi-
ating historical contamination, although the current owner could bring a lawsuit to seek contribution 
from a prior owner who caused the problem. See KATHLEEN SEGERSON, REDESIGNING CERCLA 
LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 11–13 (1995), http://reason.org/files/aea662eb74beed
0ef17df16a50cac3e4.pdf [http://perma.cc/ETU4-GP5Y] (discussing joint and several liability and the 
right of contribution). 
 115 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4. 
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As presently written, Rule 4.4 addresses collateral harm to humans. The 
ABA is currently contemplating additional requirements under Rule 8.4 that 
would forbid verbal or written advocacy by lawyers offending the dignitary 
interests of human third parties.116 Such rules are a welcome addition to the 
ethics code, but they should not be the full extent of the ethical regulations for-
bidding collateral harm. 
As part of the comprehensive amendments that promote a lawyer’s cogni-
zance of environmental harm, it is appropriate to amend Model Rule 4.4 so 
that a lawyer’s conduct that leads to unnecessary environmental degradation is 
off limits to the same extent as conduct that harms human third parties. The 
language in the proposed Rule 4.4(a) extends beyond the terminology used in 
the above-listed amendments to Rule 1.6—“imminent, substantial and irreme-
diable environmental damage”—to cover a much wider range of environmen-
tal harm, including excessive consumption of resources, generation of waste, 
and discharge of pollution. This wider coverage reflects the comparatively 
wider scope of impermissible human harm under the current Rule 4.4(a) as 
opposed to the current Rule 1.6(b). Third-party harm justifying abrogation of 
confidentiality is generally more urgent than the third-party harm cognizable 
under the current Rule 4.4(a), which is basically just a balancing test inquiring 
into the necessity for legal tactics that cause collateral damage. 
E. New Training Obligations for Supervisors (Rules 5.1 and 5.3) 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 5.1117 to read as follows: 
Rule 5.1: Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory 
Lawyers 
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or togeth-
er with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in 
a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has 
in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in 
the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct, and that all 
the lawyers in the firm minimize the consumption of resources, the 
generation of waste, the discharge of pollution, or any other degra-
dation of the environment. 
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer con-
forms to the Rules of Professional Conduct, and that the other law-
yer minimizes the consumption of resources, the generation of 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (discussing the ABA’s proposed amendments to 
Model Rule 8.4). 
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waste, the discharge of pollution, or any other degradation of the 
environment. 
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct if: 
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, rat-
ifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in 
the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct super-
visory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a 
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to 
take reasonable remedial action.  
Additionally, the ABA should amend Model Rule 5.3118 to read as fol-
lows: 
Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants 
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated 
with a lawyer: 
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other 
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect 
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer, and that 
the person minimizes the consumption of resources, the generation 
of waste, the discharge of pollution, or any other degradation of the 
environment; 
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer, and that 
the person minimizes the consumption of resources, the generation 
of waste, the discharge of pollution, or any other degradation of the 
environment; and 
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that 
would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if en-
gaged in by a lawyer if: 
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, 
ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in 
the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervi-
sory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time 
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2016] Green Ethics for Lawyers 87 
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action. 
The necessity for these two amendments is self-evident. As part of the 
overhaul promoting a lawyer’s sensitivity to environmental interests, it is im-
portant to require training and supervision that comports with the new expecta-
tions. The proposed amendments to Model Rule 5.1 set forth duties for super-
visors of lawyers. Amendments to Model Rule 5.3 are also appropriate so that 
nonlawyers working at firms receive the training and guidance necessary to 
improve environmental protection. Lawyers and law firms are capable of caus-
ing a great deal of environmental damage through excessive photocopying, 
overconsumption of power, failure to recycle, and unnecessary travel that re-
sults in a high volume of carbon emissions.119 Lawyers involved in supervision 
and training should be mindful of these potential risks as they set the expecta-
tions for subordinates’ conduct. 
F. Redefinition of Pro Bono Service (Rule 6.1) 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 6.1120 to read as follows: 
Rule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service 
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal ser-
vices to those unable to pay, and to provide legal services that im-
prove the protection of the environment. A lawyer should aspire to 
render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. 
In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: 
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services 
without fee or expectation of fee to: 
(1) assist persons of limited means; or 
(2) assist with protecting the environment; or 
(3) (2) support the work of charitable, religious, civic, community, 
governmental and educational organizations in matters that are de-
                                                                                                                           
 119 Although the ABA has not attempted to quantify the extent of wasteful practices by law firms, 
the ABA’s Law Practice Division has stressed the importance of implementing sustainable practices 
in firms. In 2010, the Law Practice Division adopted a Model Policy on Sustainability. COUNCIL OF 
THE ABA SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY & RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, FINAL ABA SEER SUSTAINABILITY 
FRAMEWORK FOR LAW ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/environ/
committees/climatechange/ModelLaw/ModelSustainabilityPolicy.pdf [http://perma.cc/4LJT-F9PL]. 
The ABA also has helped to nurture a Law Firm Sustainability Network, through which leaders of 
firms share tips and best practices. Joe Dysart, Going Green: Network Grows Even More Ecological 
Ideas, ABA J., Feb. 2014, at 30, 30 (“The network holds monthly webinars focusing on tactics to 
foster a specific facet of green consciousness . . . .”). So far, however, the ABA has focused on preca-
tory strategy and has not proposed to elevate the principle of sustainability to the black letter provi-
sions of the Model Rules. 
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signed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means, or 
to protect the environment; and 
(b) provide any additional services through: 
(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to 
individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civ-
il rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, 
community, governmental and educational organizations in matters 
in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment 
of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization’s 
economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate; 
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to per-
sons of limited means; or 
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system 
or the legal profession. 
In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support 
to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited 
means or that provide legal services for the purpose of protecting the 
environment. 
The problem with the current version of Model Rule 6.1 is that it rele-
gates environmental advocacy to the second tier of pro bono work. The ABA 
exhorts lawyers to provide at least fifty hours of pro bono service per year, and 
indicates that lawyers should devote the “substantial majority” of these hours 
to direct representation of poor people or assistance to organizations that repre-
sent the poor. The commentary to Model Rule 6.1 mentions environmental 
work as a category of pro bono service, but says that this work falls into the 
disfavored category that lawyers should attend to only after fulfilling their 
minimum obligation of twenty-six hours to assist indigent clients.121 
There is no statistical evidence indicating whether this bifurcation of pro 
bono service has reduced pro bono work on behalf of the environment, but 
such an inference is reasonable. Firms that aspire to satisfy Rule 6.1 will natu-
rally steer their lawyers toward legal work that assists low-income clients ra-
ther than environmental causes. Some lawyers still choose to focus their volun-
teer work on environmental issues, but they face the disincentive that this work 
is not cognizable under Rule 6.1 to the extent that it exceeds twenty-four hours 
per year. A lawyer who wants to devote fifty hours of pro bono service will 
need to add an extra twenty-six hours of service to the indigent if that lawyer 
wants to meet the targets set forth in Rule 6.1. The rule is aspirational, of 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Comment 6 to ABA Model Rule 6.1 provides, in pertinent part: “[I]ssues that may be ad-
dressed under [paragraph (b)(1)] include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental 
protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social 
service, medical research, cultural and religious groups.” Id. r. 6.1 cmt. 6. 
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course, but to the extent that lawyers feel bound to follow it, the rule imposes a 
twenty-six hour “tax” on environmental pro bono work. 
The ABA’s preference for poverty-related pro bono work is understanda-
ble, but it is no longer appropriate for several reasons. First, the government 
currently pays for legal assistance to the poor in both criminal122 and civil123 
cases, and the government should pay for more,124 just like the government 
pays for medical assistance to the poor.125 There is, however, no government 
program that pays for legal representation of environmental interests. To the 
contrary, state governments have threatened to withhold funding from public 
law schools’ housing clinics that advocate for the environment.126 Furthermore, 
environmental problems harm poor people much more than middle-class and 
wealthy people.127 The notion that advocacy for the poor is distinct from advo-
                                                                                                                           
 122 The federal and state governments have borne the expense of indigent defense in criminal 
prosecutions for felonies since the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 339–45 (1963) (holding that the right to a fair trial, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, requires the government to provide legal representation to the poor in criminal matters). 
 123 The Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”), funded by an appropriation from Congress, allocates 
this revenue to local legal aid organizations that help needy clients in civil cases. See How We Work, 
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/what-legal-aid/how-we-work [http://perma.cc/7573-74ZU]. 
To be sure, even the LSC acknowledges that the funding it provides is insufficient to meet the demand 
for such services. White House Forum on Increasing Access to Justice: Remarks by U.S. Attorney 
General Eric Holder, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.lsc.gov/media-center/
galleries-multimedia/video/white-house-forum-increasing-access-justice-remarks-us [http://perma.
cc/GD53-7TRP]. The fact remains, however, that government funding is presently available for the 
representation of the poor, while government funding is not generally available for the representation 
of environmental interests. Of course, the progressive community does not need an internecine con-
flict between advocates for the poor and advocates for the environment; the preferable solution would 
be to provide adequate funding for both categories of cases. 
 124 See generally Bernice K. Leber, The Time for Civil Gideon Is Now, 25 TOURO L. REV. 23 
(2009) (offering a compelling argument in favor of a “Civil Gideon”). 
 125 Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 TULANE L. REV. 727, 770 (2014). As this 
author has noted elsewhere, 
The legal needs of the poor are not solely the problem of lawyers, any more than the 
medical needs of the poor are solely the problem of doctors. Just as Congress decided to 
pay for Medicare and Medicaid from general tax revenues, so should Congress take 
concerted action to ensure that all poor people have reasonable access to publicly fund-
ed attorneys who specialize in poverty law. 
Id. 
 126 Robert Kuehn & Peter Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1981–90 (2003) (discussing attempts by state officials to dissuade law 
school clinics from representing environmental issues, and indicating that such interference has dis-
couraged proactive environmental advocacy at other schools’ clinics even in the absence of direct 
interference by state officials). 
 127 For example, experts agree the problem of anthropogenic climate change will have much more 
severe consequences for populations in developing countries than for populations in the developed world. 
E.g., J. Samson et al., Geographic Disparities and Moral Hazards in the Predicted Impacts of Climate 
Change, 20 GLOB. ECOLOGY & BIOGEOGRAPHY 532, 537–38 (2011); see also Frances Moore et al., 
Temperature Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 NATURE CLIMATE 
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cacy for the environment is a relic from the 1980s that does not make sense in 
modern times. 
G. Relaxed Conflict Rule for Board Service (Rule 6.3) 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 6.3128 to read as follows: 
Rule 6.3: Membership in Legal Services Organization 
(a) A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal 
services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer 
practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons hav-
ing interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not 
knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: 
(1) (a) if participating in the decision or action would be incompati-
ble with the lawyer’s obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or 
(2) (b) where the decision or action could have a material adverse 
effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose in-
terests are adverse to a client of the lawyer. 
(b) For purposes of this rule, the term “legal services organization” 
includes any nonprofit organization that represents clients in order 
to promote the public interest, but does not include a law reform or-
ganization, which is addressed in Rule 6.4. 
Rule 6.3 encourages lawyers to serve on the boards of nonprofit organiza-
tions, notwithstanding the possibility that a lawyer’s “nine-to-five” work might 
create, or might appear to create, occasional conflicts vis-à-vis the clients of 
the organization.129 Rule 6.3 makes clear that conflicts will not arise solely be-
                                                                                                                           
CHANGE 127–31 (2015) (finding that the disparity in impact on rich and poor countries will be much 
greater than originally estimated). Similarly, the environmental justice movement in the United States has 
demonstrated that environmental problems such as harmful emissions by industry or leaching of toxins 
from hazardous waste dumps are more likely to occur in close proximity to low-income populations than 
to middle-class or wealthy populations. Bill Chameides, Dean of Duke University’s Nicholas School of 
the Environment, has commented on the disproportionate hazards to non-white, poor Americans. Bill 
Chameides, A Look at Environmental Justice in the United States Today, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 
2014, 3:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-chameides/a-look-at-environmental-j_b_4633223.
html [http://perma.cc/2QMZ-25LG]. 
 128 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.3. 
 129 ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 504 (6th ed. 2007). As the Annotated Rules explain, 
To encourage lawyers to serve as members, officers, and directors of legal services or-
ganizations, Rule 6.3 specifies that such service is not to be used as ammunition to dis-
qualify lawyers from representing clients in the normal course of their practices. Oth-
erwise, membership in legal services organizations would expose lawyers to so many 
disqualifying conflicts that recruitment would become very difficult. 
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cause of board service, because clients of the nonprofit organization are not 
necessarily clients of a lawyer serving on the nonprofit’s board.130 
Unfortunately, the present version of Rule 6.3 seems to limit its scope to 
legal services organizations that represent indigent clients. Although the black 
letter language does not mention such a limitation, interpretations by the ABA 
suggest that the rule only applies to organizations serving the poor.131 As a re-
sult, lawyers who serve on boards of nonprofit groups that advocate for the 
environment, or that promote the public interest in other ways, cannot be sure 
they are safe from conflicts of interests arising from their board service and 
their representation of clients whose interests may be contrary to those of the 
nonprofit organization. 
Extending Rule 6.3 to a broader range of nonprofit organizations is im-
portant because those organizations need to recruit board members who are 
able to represent clients with conflicting interests. Such board members may 
help to legitimize a nonprofit in the eyes of the public. Board members who 
work primarily as attorneys for business clients might be valuable fundraisers. 
Indeed, the fact that some board members may occasionally represent adver-
sarial interests could provide the nonprofit boards with general insights that 
could guide the formulation of general policy for dealing with such interests 
(although, of course, any board member with a direct conflict as to a particular 
policy matter would need to recuse himself or herself pursuant to Rule 
6.3(a)(2)). 
The proposed amendment to Rule 6.3 attempts to realize the promise of 
this rule as a general incentive for service on nonprofit boards. The amendment 
would not simply extend the rule’s coverage to environmental nonprofits, but 
also to all other nonprofits that promote the public interest. No amendment to 
the parallel Rule 6.4132 is necessary, however, because that rule does not use 
the term “legal services organization.” 
                                                                                                                           
Id. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE 
AND THE PROFESSIONS (2005) (arguing that calibration of conflict rules might encourage pro bono 
service by lawyers). 
 130 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974) (holding that for 
conflicts purposes, only the organization’s staff lawyers represent the organization; board members do 
not interact directly with the clients of the organization and therefore do not represent them). 
 131 ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 129, at 503 (“The Model Rules do not 
define ‘legal services organization,’ but the phrase seems to mean pro bono organizations that provide 
legal services to the disadvantaged.”). For example, comment 4 to Model Rule 1.0 (the glossary for 
the Model Rules) uses the term “legal aid” interchangeably with the term “legal services organiza-
tion.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 4. 
 132 Model Rule 6.4 provides as follows: 
A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in re-
form of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the in-
terests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client 
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The wider application of Rule 6.3 should not cause a division of loyalty 
that impairs lawyers’ work for their clients. The residual conflicts provision in 
Rule 1.7(a)(2) would still serve as a safeguard for such lawyers, preventing 
them from representing any client if their loyalty to another interest—
including to a nonprofit organization—would create a “significant risk of ma-
terial limitation” with respect to the client.133 
H. New Standard for Conduct Unbecoming a Lawyer (Rule 8.4)134 
The ABA should amend Model Rule 8.4135 to read as follows: 
Rule 8.4: Misconduct 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act tort or violation of civil or criminal law 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice; 
                                                                                                                           
may be materially benefitted by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer 
shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.4. 
 133 Model Rule 1.7(a) provides as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the rep-
resentation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be mate-
rially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
Id. r. 1.7(a). 
 134 Of course, the phrase “conduct unbecoming a lawyer” does not appear anywhere in the ABA 
Model Rules. This phrase derives from Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which 
penalizes “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2012). In the instant context, the phrase “conduct unbecoming a lawyer” is 
a useful shorthand for the much more cumbersome language in Rule 8.4(b) (indicating that it is pro-
fessional misconduct for a lawyer to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects”) and Rule 8.4(c) (indicating that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation”). MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b)–(c). 
 135 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4. 
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(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government 
agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or 
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a 
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law. 
The current version of Model Rule 8.4(b) mentions criminal acts that 
might necessitate review of a lawyer’s fitness to practice law. The ABA should 
expand the language of Rule 8.4(b) to cover common law torts and violations 
of civil law that might also cast doubt on the lawyer’s worthiness to continue 
in the profession. Intentional and severe degradation of the environment might 
very well raise questions about fitness to continue as a lawyer—a position of 
public trust, and a position that is tantamount to service as an officer of the 
court. Due to the underdevelopment and infrequent enforcement of criminal 
environmental law,136 many categories of environmental degradation are pres-
ently only actionable as torts or as violations of civil law.137 A lawyer who 
evades criminal sanctions should not be able to also dodge accountability for 
his or her misdeeds under Rule 8.4(b). The most important consideration 
should be the extent of the misjudgment demonstrated by the attorney, not the 
particular forum of the legal action seeking remedy or punishment for the law-
yer’s misconduct. 
Some might question whether the proposed version of Rule 8.4(b) would 
capture too much conduct. The proposed language would apply not only to 
environmental torts and violations of civil environmental law, but also to any 
other category of tort or civil violation. This more general application is neces-
sary because there is no principled reason to take account of noncriminal mis-
                                                                                                                           
 136 See STUART BELL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 311 (8th ed. 2013) (mentioning that, within 
the European Union, environmental criminal law is “relatively underdeveloped in comparison with 
other areas of environmental law”); Charles Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Envi-
ronmental Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (indicating that criminal prosecutions are still fairly 
novel among the range of possible legal responses to environmental harm); Kathleen Brickey, Envi-
ronmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental Law and Criminal Law Theo-
ry, 71 TULANE L. REV. 487, 488 (noting that “environmental crime is relatively new”). 
 137 For example, a nuisance action in tort, or a suit for violating a civil statute, may be the only 
response to a brazen and egregious act of environmental contamination such as repeated dumping of 
hazardous waste on the property of another. Even if a criminal statute—such as the state analog to the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act—might apply in such a case, local prosecutors might exer-
cise discretion to refrain from filing charges, perhaps due to their inexperience with environmental 
matters or their desire to prosecute other categories of crime that they deem more urgent. See Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012)). See generally Babbitt et al., supra note 136, at 4–10 
(observing that prosecutorial discretion has played a very significant role in determining whether 
environmental harm results in criminal charges). In theory, the current version of Rule 8.4(b) might 
potentially apply to uncharged conduct that technically violates a criminal statute, but in that context 
unconvicted conduct is less likely to come to the attention of state bars and will require more investi-
gative work by bar officials. 
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conduct that involves mistreatment of the environment while ignoring other 
noncriminal conduct involving mistreatment of children, intimate partners, the 
elderly, and others. In any event, a tort suit or alleged civil law violation will 
only lead to discipline under the revised Rule 8.4(b) if the conduct at issue “re-
flects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects.” Apparently the filter provided by this quoted clause has op-
erated reliably enough over the last three decades while the coverage of Rule 
8.4(b) has extended to any criminal act—even misdemeanors.138 Surely there 
are torts and civil law violations that deserve consideration under Rule 8.4(b) 
to the same extent as misdemeanors. 
Additionally, the commentary to Model Rule 8.4 should indicate that a 
lawyer who commits a tort or violates civil law and thereby causes substantial 
environmental harm might deserve discipline under Rule 8.4(b). The environ-
ment, like some abused children or senior citizens, cannot speak up to end the 
victimization, and that is precisely why the lawyer, as an officer of the court, 
bears a unique duty to act for the protection of the defenseless. Abdication of 
that duty could indicate unfitness to continue in the practice of law. 
III. MORE RADICAL IDEAS FOR CHANGES TO THE MODEL RULES 
Admittedly, none of the ideas set forth below is presently ready for adop-
tion. The goal in presenting these more inchoate ideas here is to spur discus-
sion that might eventually culminate in viable proposals. Section A considers 
the possibility of banning positional conflicts.139 Section B next examines 
whether a more lenient rule against frivolous claims would be appropriate.140 
Section C then contemplates the possibility of imposing a duty on lawyers to 
report environmental risks to the tribunal.141 Section D evaluates the possible 
benefits of permitting for-profit solicitation.142 Finally, section E considers the 
potential value of environmental scorecards for firms.143 
A. A Ban on Positional Conflicts (Rule 1.7) 
Consider the possible benefits (and harms) of amending Model Rule 
1.7144 to read as follows: 
Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Rule 8.4(b) has existed in its current form since 1983. ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, supra note 65 (providing the 1983 and 2013 versions of Model Rule 8.4(b)). 
 139 See infra notes 144–154 and accompanying text. 
 140 See infra notes 155–164 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 166–175 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 176–182 and accompanying text. 
 144 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
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(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent 
a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of inter-
est. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to anoth-
er client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by any the following: the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person; or 
by a personal interest of the lawyer; or by the lawyer’s past or pre-
sent advocacy of a position inconsistent with the position that the 
lawyer would foreseeably need to take if the lawyer represented one 
or more clients in the instant matter. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest 
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected cli-
ent; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by 
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the 
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writ-
ing. 
Arguably, there might be some benefit in requiring lawyers to take con-
sistent positions in their advocacy activities, especially in a relatively new field 
such as environmental law. The dearth of case law in such a field heightens the 
precedential significance of each new ruling, and may create an incentive for a 
lawyer to skew advocacy on behalf of one client in order to establish a prece-
dent favorable to another client with different interests. For example, when a 
lawyer does pro bono work for a plaintiff seeking strict enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws, and the lawyer generally does paid work for defendants seek-
ing to weaken enforcement of these laws, that lawyer might perhaps have 
stronger loyalty to the paying clients. Therefore, the lawyer might approach the 
plaintiff’s work with diminished zeal or might forego certain strategies that 
could eventually redound to the detriment of the paying clients. Even a lawyer 
who does not feel such a division of loyalty might lose credibility when argu-
ing that a judge should adopt a different position from the one that the lawyer 
advocated in a prior hearing before the same judge. For example, if a lawyer 
usually works for industrial polluters, that lawyer might seem disingenuous 
when bringing a lawsuit on behalf of a neighbor of a factory (not represented 
by the same lawyer) emitting the same type of pollution emitted by the law-
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yer’s clients. Perhaps lawyers would be better advocates for their clients if the 
ABA adopted an amendment to Rule 1.7(a)(2) as proposed herein.145  
Beyond the benefit of ensuring the “purity” of advocacy, there might be 
some benefit in imposing costs for side-switching: lawyers and firms might not 
want to commit permanently to opposing the cause of environmental protec-
tion.146 
Although there is some intuitive appeal to the argument for substantive 
consistency, the argument has several flaws. First, Rule 1.7(a)(2) already ex-
tends to any circumstances that could give rise to a “significant risk” of mate-
rial limitation, and positional conflicts are cognizable under—if not explicitly 
recognized by—the present version of Rule 1.7(a)(2).147 Second, there is little 
                                                                                                                           
 145 The proposed requirement of greater consistency in advocacy is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the proposal in Part II, section G, to liberalize the conflict-of-interest rule for a lawyer who gen-
erally represents defendants in a certain category of cases but wants to serve on the board of directors 
for a legal services organization that generally represents plaintiffs in the same category of cases. See 
supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text. As noted previously, the ABA has issued an ethics opin-
ion indicating that a lawyer who serves on a board of directors for an organization is not representing 
the clients of that organization, and in any event, that lawyer would need to recuse himself or herself 
from the organization’s discussion of matters in which the lawyers’ clients might have material inter-
ests. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974); supra note 130 and 
accompanying text. 
 146 Among other problems, a firm that must commit to representing only defendants in environ-
mental litigation might have trouble recruiting idealistic law students. Cf. John E. Bonine, The Diver-
gent Paths of Environmental Law Practice: A Reply to Professor Manaster, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
265, 276 (2010) (suggesting that firms might not want to reveal to prospective job applicants that the 
firms “generally and habitually refuse to offer their services to citizen groups on significant environ-
mental matters”). 
 147 Comment 24 to ABA Model Rule 1.7 includes language indicating that a positional conflict 
might possibly rise to a level that could require disqualification under Rule 1.7(a)(2): 
A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s action 
on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer’s effectiveness in representing 
another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will 
create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other 
client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk 
include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the 
temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immedi-
ate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients’ reasonable expecta-
tions in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then ab-
sent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the repre-
sentations or withdraw from one or both matters. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24. As one scholar explained, 
[A] positional conflict is not a per se ethical violation, but may become a conflict of in-
terest if the issue is important enough to the clients and there is a risk that one represen-
tation will materially limit the other; for example, by leading to precedent from one 
case that will adversely control the other . . . . 
Helen Anderson, Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with Positional Conflicts: “A Foolish Consisten-
cy”?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). 
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need for a stricter ethical rule on positional conflicts because firms have a self-
ish economic interests in avoiding such conflicts.148 Third, if an express rule 
against positional conflicts led to the disqualification of more potential pro 
bono lawyers, the representation of environmental plaintiffs would dwindle.149 
Fourth, the ABA generally does not impute to lawyers the positions that their 
clients take,150 so strict enforcement of a rule against positional conflicts would 
be inconsistent with the overall tenor of the current rules. Fifth, there could be 
many harmful consequences if the ABA penalized side-switching based on 
substantive positions taken by lawyers rather than based on the representation 
of particular parties: lawyers would only be able to handle a narrow range of 
cases, the compartmentalization of the bar might cause greater acrimony be-
tween lawyers,151 and the conflicts rules might constrain lawyers’ freedom of 
expression.152 
Perhaps the most prudent near-term approach would be to retain the pre-
sent black letter language in Rule 1.7, but amend the commentary to draw 
more attention to the potential harm that positional conflicts could cause. The 
present language in comment 24 to Model Rule 1.7 seems too dismissive of 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2393 (2010) (indicating that firms take far fewer environmental pro bono 
cases than other categories of pro bono cases due to concerns about alienating present and future busi-
ness clients); see Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro Bono, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2448 (2010) 
(noting that firms representing business clients rarely take on environmental pro bono matters); Bon-
ine, supra note 146, at 273–74 (contending that the reason why business law firms decline environ-
mental pro bono work is not “an ethical judgment but a business judgment”); Norman W. Spaulding, 
The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1395, 1414 (1998) (indicating that environmental matters are among the categories of pro bono work 
that private firms refuse to do). 
 149 There is a longstanding debate about whether the quantity or quality of pro bono representa-
tion is more important. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, From Park Place to Community Chest: Rethinking 
Lawyers’ Monopoly, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1343, 1356 (2007) (arguing that increasing the quantity of 
pro bono hours is more important than ensuring that all pro bono attorneys perform their duties opti-
mally). 
 150 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (“A lawyer’s representation of a client, includ-
ing representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, eco-
nomic, social or moral views or activities.”); Spaulding, supra note 148, at 1422 (noting that in the 
traditional conception of legal representation, it is the client who takes a position, and the lawyer is a 
mere conduit for the client’s position). 
 151 For further development of this point, see infra notes 196–199 and accompanying text. 
 152 Sande L. Buhai, Lawyers and the First Amendment: Conflict Between Former Clients and 
Personal Speech, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 73, 75 (2014). This can happen, for example, 
If an attorney with a multinational law firm is barred from speaking publicly as a citi-
zen about any issue in which one of the firm’s many clients has an interest—such as 
abortion, global warming, tax policy, or defense spending—she runs a disciplinary risk 
if she speaks as a citizen about anything. Indeed, such rules, if expansively enforced, 
might effectively silence most big-firm attorneys for life. 
Id. 
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positional conflicts. The first two sentences of comment 24 to Model ABA 
Rule 1.7, however, provide as follows: 
Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different 
tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere 
fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might 
create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by 
the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of inter-
est.153 
Rather than indicate at the outset that positional conflicts are generally in-
consequential, the commentary should indicate that positional conflicts, like 
the third-party interests listed in the black letter language of Rule 1.7(a)(2), 
will require disqualification whenever they create a significant risk of material 
limitation. The commentary should also list the factors that are relevant to as-
sessing whether such a risk exists to provide necessary guidance.154 
B. A More Lenient Rule Against Frivolous Claims (Rule 3.1) 
Consider the possible benefits (and harms) of amending Model Rule 3.1155 
to read as follows: 
Rule 3.1: Meritorious Claims and Contentions 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or contro-
vert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing 
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceed-
ing that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the 
proceeding as to require that every element of the case be estab-
lished. A lawyer in an environmental proceeding does not violate 
this rule by asserting a claim on behalf of a nonhuman interest even 
though that interest presently lacks standing under the current pro-
cedural rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer asserts the 
claim, if the lawyer is arguing in good faith for modification of the 
standing rules. 
Attorneys who seek to protect the environment sometimes find that pre-
sent law—especially the rules regarding standing—are inhospitable to their 
claims. The risk of sanctions for frivolous claims may seem particularly daunt-
ing for attorneys operating in a field as new and dynamic as environmental 
                                                                                                                           
 153 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24. 
 154 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing comment 24 to Model Rule 1.7). 
 155 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1. 
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law.156 For example, attorneys who aspire to represent nonhuman environmen-
tal interests,157 or who want to represent humans who would suffer future harm 
from climate change,158 often find that current law denies standing to such 
claimants. Perhaps an amendment to Rule 3.1 should clarify that arguments to 
extend standing in environmental cases are not frivolous, so long as the attor-
ney is making a good-faith argument. After all, an argument that seems novel 
today might become the law of the land a decade later.159 
On the other hand, there are a number of legitimate arguments against 
amending Rule 3.1 to reduce the inhibition of environmental attorneys present-
ing novel standing arguments. First, it appears that the current rules against 
frivolous claims have not significantly limited the ability of environmental 
plaintiffs to present novel standing arguments.160 Second, there may be a risk 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Monica Dias, Morris-Smith v. Moulten Niguel Water District: The Double Standard for 
Attorney Fees Under the Clean Water Act, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 549, 563–64 (2000). As such, 
[T]he frivolous standard appears troublesome for unsuccessful plaintiffs in environmen-
tal litigation because they have no solid definition of “frivolous” to gauge, before filing 
their claim, whether their case will be deemed legitimate. Courts have used the term 
“frivolous” without defining it. Standard definitions of “frivolous” as “fictitious or un-
founded litigation” or “groundless lawsuit with little prospect of success” do not pro-
vide much help for plaintiffs trying to determine whether their claim is strong enough to 
withstand a ruling of “frivolous.” 
Id.; see also Geltman, supra note 99, at 755 (“A related ethical problem environmental lawyers rou-
tinely face is the duty to pursue novel or unpopular theories of law. There is a fine line between ‘push-
ing the law for change’ and bringing a frivolous lawsuit.”). 
 157 Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals 
Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2–7 (1985) (renewing a proposal that the non-
human environment could be a plaintiff and a human advocacy group could be a guardian ad litem for 
that plaintiff; noting that advocates have attempted to file claims on behalf on nonhuman interests 
with generally unsuccessful results). See generally Wise, supra note 62 (discussing the difficulty 
faced by the Nonhuman Rights Project in attempting to establish standing for chimpanzees). 
 158 Patrick McGinley, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 7, 
10 (2013) (noting that young plaintiffs have attempted in several states to invoke the public trust doc-
trine in order to prevent ongoing climate change that could be disastrous in the future; “[s]everal cases 
have been dismissed on standing”). 
 159 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015, acknowledging the right 
to same-sex marriage, demonstrates that the legal system benefits when attorneys “push the envelope” 
with an argument that is initially contrary to prevailing law. Compare Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 
F.3d 673, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a same-sex couple lacked standing to protest the Defense 
of Marriage Act), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“The limitation of mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the 
central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.”). 
 160 David Sive, Particular Ethical Problems in Environmental Litigation, SM028 ALI-ABA 419, 
431 (2006). As one scholar noted, 
There is now a considerable body of environmental case law involving Rule 11 and the 
question of whether a particular argument is frivolous or nonfrivolous. They, in general, 
follow the rule of non-environmental cases, that the test is one of “reasonability.” Rea-
sonability, however, as suggested in earlier issues of these materials, may provide in 
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that a more lenient rule for the frivolousness of claims in environmental litiga-
tion could lead to greater indulgence of counterclaims and suits by defendants 
attempting to retaliate against plaintiffs.161 Third, the liberalization of standing 
requirements in environmental cases might lead to a lower standard in other 
categories of litigation, perhaps emboldening attorneys to seek standing for, for 
example, unborn fetuses who would sue to prevent abortions or ancestors of-
fended by the removal of Confederate flags from state property.162 Alternately, 
even if Rule 3.1 plainly applied only to standing for environmental claims, the 
amendment might have a pernicious effect in implying that no other category 
of public interest lawyer could invoke the exception to Rule 3.1 allowing 
good-faith advocacy for extension of the standing requirements.163 This conse-
quence might hinder efforts to extend the standing rules for potential claimants 
                                                                                                                           
environmental cases a more liberal standard of what is nonfrivolous, owing to the new-
ness of the relevant body of law. 
Id. Thus, 
[P]laintiffs who are unsuccessful in their claims can conclude that, as long as their 
claims pose a novel question or have some reasonable basis, courts will tend to be gen-
erous in finding that those claims are not frivolous. Thus, plaintiffs appear to face a low 
risk of a court finding their environmental lawsuits frivolous, which should dispel any 
fears that the “frivolous” standard will create an atmosphere in which plaintiffs are dis-
couraged from filing suits. 
Dias, supra note 156, at 566; Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 429, 437–38, 469–73 (1992) (noting that courts have rarely deemed environmental claims to be 
frivolous). But see Tobias, supra, at 482 (considering the possibility that current rules against frivo-
lous claims have led environmental plaintiffs to exercise self-restraint in order to avoid offending 
those rules). 
 161 To be sure, the rule proposed at the start of this section would not directly assist such counter-
claims. But a judge who gives greater leniency to plaintiffs might be inclined to liberalize the highly 
discretionary standards for evaluating the frivolousness of counterclaims. Litigation by defendants 
against plaintiffs can have a significant chilling effect on environmental claims to advance the public 
interest. See David J. Abell, Exercise of Constitutional Privileges: Deterring Abuse of the First 
Amendment—“Strategic Lawsuits Against Political Participation,” 47 SMU L. REV. 95, 115–16 
(1993) (observing that environmental litigants rarely invoke Rule 11 to protest frivolousness of 
claims, but expressing concern that “SLAPP suits are preferred over other” means of “control[ling]” 
environmental claims; these SLAPP suits expose “citizen activists to ‘liability which is orders of 
magnitude larger than Rule 11’” (quoting Tobias, supra note 160, at 489)). 
 162 The United States currently stands at odds with most countries in the western hemisphere in 
declining to accord full standing to unborn fetuses. Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights establishes that governments must protect life “from the moment of conception.” Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. If the United States 
adopted such an approach, the result might be a significant effect on the availability of abortion. 
 163 According to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one 
or more things of a particular class may be regarded as impliedly excluding others. ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (2012) (discuss-
ing the negative implication canon, whereby “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of 
others”). 
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such as illegal aliens or future students in a school district with inadequate 
funding.164 
In the near term, the most prudent course might be to retain the current 
black letter language in Rule 3.1, while perhaps clarifying in the commentary 
that novel theories of standing in environmental lawsuits have rarely offended 
this rule. As public interest attorneys continue to push the boundaries of stand-
ing rules in the future, the ABA should evaluate whether any amendment to 
Rule 3.1 is necessary to accommodate such litigation. 
C. A Duty to Inform the Tribunal of Environmental Risks (Rule 3.3) 
Consider the possible benefits (and harms) of amending Model Rule 
3.3165 to read as follows: 
Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to cor-
rect a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal by the lawyer; 
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the posi-
tion of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the 
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered mate-
rial evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer 
shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, 
other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false.; or 
(4) fail to disclose to the tribunal that a witness called by the attor-
ney is engaged, has engaged or plans to engage in a course of con-
duct that is likely to result in imminent, substantial, and irremediable 
environmental damage, if the witness has taken the stand and given 
contrary testimony. 
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding 
and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has 
                                                                                                                           
 164 Throughout U.S. history, many have benefited from attempts by public interest attorneys to 
expand standing rules and related laws. “Children, slaves, women, Native Americans, racial minori-
ties, aliens, fetuses, endangered species—all have been the beneficiaries of this drive to give legal 
voice and legal rights to those who once lacked both voice and rights.” Joseph J. Perkins, Christopher 
Stone and the Evolution of Environmental Justice, PRINCETON INDEP. (2003), http://www.princeton
independent.com/issue01.03/item10d.html [http://perma.cc/3PL3-SYM7]. 
 165 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3. 
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engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding 
shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal. 
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the con-
clusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires 
disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of 
all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to 
make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. 
In other words, the amendment to Rule 3.3(a)(4) would be a per se rule of 
materiality. Rule 3.3(a)(1) currently requires correction of material statements 
that the lawyer comes to learn are false, but does not require correction of past 
immaterial statements. The amendment would eliminate any doubt that state-
ments regarding imminent, substantial and irremediable environmental damage 
are material even if they might appear collateral to the issues arising in a par-
ticular case. The language of the amendment differs from the existing Rule 
3.3(a)(3) in that disclosure to the tribunal would be the only remedy—as op-
posed to other avenues of recourse, such as entreating the witness to revise his 
or her testimony—because the revelation of the information is so urgently im-
portant. The amendment would arguably assist the effort to bring environmen-
tal harm to light, and would comport with the current ABA Model Rules’ 
heighted obligation of candor to the tribunal. Courts and attorneys would rare-
ly face the need to enforce the proposed rule, because attorneys would proba-
bly advise their witnesses about the rule before the witnesses testify. 
One significant drawback of this amendment is that judges are not in a 
position to take action in order to avert the imminent harm that a witness might 
identify. Another possible concern is that the amendment might lead to settle-
ment of claims that deserve to be aired in court, because defendants would be 
fearful that the ethical rules would necessitate disclosure of environmental 
harm collateral to the pending litigation. Finally, there might be some reserva-
tions about a rule that requires lawyers to slow trials down with cumbersome 
disclosures. 
Perhaps a better version of this amendment would channel information 
about environmental harm to a government agency capable of remediating or 
averting that harm. Or perhaps a preferable approach would be to change the 
materiality standard so that more harm to third parties in general (including 
nonhuman third parties) might be just as important as centrality to the pending 
litigation. In any event, it should be more difficult to mischaracterize imminent 
environmental harm when giving sworn testimony in a trial. 
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D. A Relaxation of the Ban on For-Profit Solicitation (Rule 7.3) 
Consider the possible benefits (and harms) of amending Model Rule 
7.3166 to read as follows: 
Rule 7.3: Solicitation of Clients 
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time elec-
tronic contact solicit professional employment when a significant 
motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain, un-
less the person contacted: 
(1) is a lawyer; or 
(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship 
with the lawyer.; or 
(3) is a claimant or prospective claimant in an environmental matter, 
and a significant motive for the lawyer’s solicitation is the desire to 
protect the environment. 
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by written, 
recorded or electronic communication or by in-person, telephone or 
real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise prohibited by 
paragraph (a), if: 
(1) the target of the solicitation has made known to the lawyer a de-
sire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or 
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment. 
(c) Every written, recorded or electronic communication from a 
lawyer soliciting professional employment from anyone known to 
be in need of legal services in a particular matter shall include the 
words “Advertising Material” on the outside envelope, if any, and at 
the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic communica-
tion, unless the recipient of the communication is a person specified 
in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2). 
(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may 
participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an 
organization not owned or directed by the lawyer that uses in-person 
or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the 
plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a 
particular matter covered by the plan. 
More lenient treatment of solicitation167 in environmental cases would ar-
guably further the public interest. Plaintiffs’ attorneys specializing in environ-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3. 
 167 In this context, the term “solicitation” refers to an attorney’s direct communication with a 
person known to need legal services, where the attorney seeks to provide representation to that person. 
Since 1978, for-profit solicitation has been illegal when the attorney uses the most intrusive means of 
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mental law reach out to prospective clients by various means that could con-
ceivably offend the current rule against solicitation, including methods as in-
nocuous as marketing by means of websites.168 Solicitation can be more im-
portant in environmental cases than in other categories of cases: whereas person-
al injury cases, for example, are fairly straightforward, and prospective claim-
ants are likely to understand the nature of their legal rights, the complexity of 
environmental law increases the value of the attorney who educates the pro-
spective client while proposing to represent that client. 
At first blush, the current ban on for-profit solicitation might appear to 
exempt attorneys for environmental plaintiffs, whose work arguably has the 
“political” character that the U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished from for-
profit solicitation. The problem, however, is that environmental suits can some-
times result in substantial fees when plaintiffs prevail,169 so it may be difficult 
for plaintiffs’ counsel to judge whether the ban on for-profit solicitation applies 
to these lawyers’ interactions with prospective environmental plaintiffs.  
The draft language provided herein offers one possible means of soften-
ing the ban against solicitation by plaintiffs’ counsel in environmental cases. 
Even when financial gain might be a significant motive for plaintiffs’ counsel 
in an environmental case, the amendment would allow solicitation to proceed 
if the goal of environmental protection was also a significant motive. This re-
form seems sensible because the solicitation rules should incentivize lawyers to 
take public interest cases,170 and environmental protection is in the public inter-
est, even if a plaintiffs’ attorney manages to collect a substantial fee. Moreover, 
due to the complexity of environmental litigation and the contingency of suc-
cess upon many variables, an attorney is rarely able to determine if the case 
will yield a substantial fee before meeting with a prospective client, so a leni-
ent rule permitting first meetings would seem to foster a better marketplace for 
representation. 
                                                                                                                           
approaching the prospective client (i.e., face-to-face contact, live telephonic contact, or real-time elec-
tronic communication). 
 168 Pamela Esterman, Ethical Considerations for the Environmental Lawyer, SU026 ALI-CLE 
297 (2013) (noting that environmental lawyers’ use of blogs for marketing could run afoul of certain 
ethical rules, including the rule against solicitation, to the extent that lawyers use this tool for targeted 
appeals to prospective clients). 
 169 See, e.g., A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations of Citizen-Suit Provi-
sions of Environmental Litigation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 11–12 (2001) (noting that pre-
vailing plaintiffs’ attorneys may find environmental suits to be lucrative). 
 170 See generally Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 743–51 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the importance of providing financial incentives for private plaintiffs’ counsel to bring law-
suits in the public interest); Orahlik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 469, 470–72 (1978) (Marshall, 
J., concurring) (arguing that while the respondent in this case engaged in improper conduct, a per se 
ban on for-profit solicitation goes too far, because the willingness of attorneys to approach potential 
claimants promotes access to justice, especially in historically marginalized communities). 
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Admittedly, however, there are reasons to approach reform of the solicita-
tion rules with caution. First, plaintiffs’ lawyers are already able to solicit for 
profit by less intrusive means, such as mailing a letter, so it is not clear that 
more permissive rules are necessary for environmental lawyers to reach all 
prospective claimants.171 Second, solicitation via face-to-face contact can be 
very unpopular with the public—the “ambulance-chasing lawyer” is a common 
target for opprobrium—and the liberalization of solicitation rules might pro-
voke a backlash that could prove costly for environmental lawyers or for the 
bar in general.172 Third, an amendment that expressly permits solicitation for 
profit in environmental cases might imply a ban on such solicitation in other 
categories of public interest cases that could yield substantial fees, such as civil 
rights cases.173 One additional drawback of allowing environmental attorneys 
to solicit for profit is that these attorneys might feel less pressure to maintain a 
large docket of pro bono cases in order to lend credibility to their claim that 
ideology motivates most of their solicitations. Finally, the attempt to address 
the restrictive standing requirements by recruiting human plaintiffs more ag-
gressively might reduce momentum for extending the standing rules to non-
human plaintiffs.174 
Rather than overhaul Rule 7.3 in the near future, the best approach might 
be to slightly revise its commentary. New language could make clear that the 
presence of both financial and political motives should not necessarily defeat a 
finding that the solicitation has a political character, especially in an environ-
mental case. The commentary should include guidance and illustrations that 
help lawyers distinguish circumstances in which political motivations are suf-
ficient to avoid the per se ban, even when financial gain is possible.175 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Model Rule 7.3(a) bans solicitation by in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic con-
tact when financial interests are a significant part of the lawyer’s motivation, but Model Rule 7.3(b) 
indicates that less intrusive means of solicitation by profit-seeking lawyers are permissible as long as 
they do not involve coercion, exploitation of duress, or persistence after a prospective client indicates 
that further contact is unwelcome. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a)–(b). 
 172 In 1977, in In re Primus, Justice Rehnquist contended that solicitation by a politically motivat-
ed attorney is no less onerous from the standpoint of the prospective client. 436 U.S. 412, 440–46 
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). If an increase in solicitation were to cause general public consterna-
tion, the effect could be harmful for environmental plaintiffs’ counsel or perhaps for the bar as a 
whole, especially if elected officials in the state legislature or on state supreme courts felt that lawyers 
were no longer trustworthy enough to regulate themselves. See Tom Lininger, Should Oregon Adopt 
the New ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct?, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1031, 1042–43 (2003) 
(discussing the risk that elected officials might not want to continue allowing self-regulation by law-
yers if it appears to be contrary to the public interest). 
 173 For a discussion of the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, see supra note 163 and 
accompanying text. 
 174 See supra note 157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to liberalize standing 
requirements so that nonhumans can be plaintiffs. 
 175 The current commentary to Rule 7.3 provides no such guidance. 
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E. Environmental Scorecards for Firms (Rule 7.7) 
Consider the possible benefits (and harms) of adding a new Rule 7.7 at 
the end of the rules concerning marketing. 
Rule 7.7: Environmental Scorecards 
Every firm, and every lawyer practicing separately from a firm, shall 
complete and timely submit to the Bar an annual questionnaire seek-
ing information about firms’ and lawyers’ activities and initiatives 
relevant to environmental protection, including pro bono work, con-
tinuing legal education, minimization of waste, reduction of carbon 
emissions, and compliance with building or remodeling standards. 
The Bar shall compile this information, along with relevant infor-
mation concerning results of disciplinary proceedings, and will 
make this information available for review by the public. 
The purpose of an environmental scorecard would be to hold firms and 
lawyers publicly accountable for their performances on certain criteria measur-
ing their efforts to protect the environment. The precise criteria might vary 
from year to year, and might depend on then-prevailing views of sustainable 
practices. The ABA176 and state bars in California,177 Massachusetts,178 Ore-
gon,179 and Pennsylvania180 have established guidelines for law offices seeking 
to minimize their environmental impact. The existing programs are hortatory 
                                                                                                                           
 176 The ABA’s Section on Environment, Energy and Resources has created a website with various 
resources for law firms that are interested in improving sustainability. Law Firm Sustainability 
Framework, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_
resources/public_service/model_law.html [http://perma.cc/5CQC-GVCQ]. 
 177 The website of the State Bar of California includes information concerning a “Voluntary Eco-
Pledge” and a “Voluntary Law Office Sustainability Policy,” along with the names of firms that have 
signed the pledge. Voluntary State Bar of California Lawyers Eco-Pledge and Voluntary Law Office 
Sustainability Policy, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://environmental.calbar.ca.gov/EnvironmentalLaw/
Sustainability.aspx [http://perma.cc/ZX32-P2Z3]. 
 178 The Massachusetts Bar Association (“MBA”) established “Green Guidelines” and offered to 
publicize a list of firms that pledged to “do their best to adhere” to the guidelines and other relevant 
protocols published by the MBA. At the present time, the list of firms, organizations, and lawyers that 
signed the pledge totals over 100. The MBA Lawyers Eco-Challenge, MASS. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.massbar.org/for-attorneys/lawyers-eco-challenge [http://perma.cc/YUW9-8BCA]. 
 179 The Sustainable Future Section of the Oregon State Bar has established criteria for law firms 
that want to qualify for recognition as “partners in sustainability.” Partners in Sustainability, OR. 
STATE BAR, http://osbsustainablefuture.org/home/partnerships-in-sustainability/ [http://perma.cc/
4XEP-Z2H7]; see also LAWYERS FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, http://www.sustainablelawyers.org 
[http://perma.cc/4VU3-XYAX] (offering tools for firms that want to strengthen their commitment to 
sustainability). 
 180 Pennsylvania Lawyers United for Sustainability (PLUS) Program, PA. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.pabar.org/public/sections/envco/plusprogram.asp [http://perma.cc/G3AD-YR3L] (providing 
information on an initiative that gives attorneys and law firms an opportunity to publicly demonstrate 
their commitment to environmental sustainability in their professional practices). 
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and offer to provide recognition to firms that strive to improve sustainability, 
but do not require all firms to report on their progress.181 
The question remains whether a mandatory reporting system would ad-
vance the cause of environmental protection. Firms might have an incentive to 
earn public admiration—or avoid public embarrassment—when state bars au-
tomatically publish the environmental scorecards every year.182 For example, 
firms seeking employment by government agencies, universities, nonprofits, or 
other clients concerned about environmental issues would attend carefully to 
their scorecards in order to project a favorable image to this audience of poten-
tial clients. The scorecards might also have an influence on a firm’s appeal to 
prospective employees, especially law students and recent graduates who may 
feel strongly about the importance of environmental protection. 
On the other hand, the use of environmental scorecards could cause harm-
ful inequities if large firms are able to use their superior resources to “game” 
the system. Larger firms might be able to assign one employee to undertake 
superficial sustainability initiatives and thereby garner accolades for environ-
mental sensitivity even when the firm’s substantive work does not align with 
the public interest. If the scorecards were little more than window dressing, 
they would be counterproductive, hindering the ability of the public to discern 
which firms are truly champions of the environment. Additionally, the state 
bars would need to devote time and resources to evaluating firms on environ-
mental criteria, detracting from other priorities such as matching attorneys with 
pro bono opportunities. Finally, there is a risk that the compulsory nature of the 
scorecards might prompt resentment toward initiatives that increase environ-
mental protection, and might diminish lawyers’ enthusiasm for voluntary ser-
vice to help the environment. 
                                                                                                                           
 181 For example, the ABA and the Environmental Protection Agency teamed up to issue a “Law 
Office Climate Challenge” that offered to recognize firms implementing a set of guidelines in order to 
reduce their impact on the climate and the environment. Participation in this program was completely 
voluntary, and there was no effort to draw attention to firms that declined to participate. ABA-EPA 
Law Office Climate Challenge, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_
energy_resources/public_service/aba_epa_law_office_climate_challenge.html [http://perma.cc/DFP3-
JQ6J]. 
 182 The use of environmental scorecards is arguably just a small extension of existing programs 
for reporting lawyers’ pro bono work. According to a survey by the ABA in June 2015, a total of nine 
state bars now mandate reporting of pro bono hours, while another thirteen state bars have established 
voluntary reporting regimes. Pro Bono Reporting Links,  AM. BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/
legalservices/probono/reporting/pbreporting.html [http://perma.cc/H9NW-34J5]. The states that man-
date reporting of pro bono hours are Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, 
New Mexico, and New York. Id. The state bars that have set up voluntary reporting systems are Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Id. 
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IV. FORESEEABLE OBJECTIONS 
This Part considers possible objections to the proposals discussed previ-
ously. One category of potential objections, discussed in section A, faults the 
proposals for imposing burdens disproportionate to the benefits the proposals 
might achieve.183 Specifically, these objections predict that the reforms would 
alienate clients from attorneys, would cause an internecine rivalry within the 
bar, and would create a precedent leading to other more onerous regulation of 
attorneys. On the other hand, section B considers the possible critique that the 
proposals in this Article do not go far enough.184 According to this critique, the 
proposals rely too heavily on permissive rather than mandatory disclosure, and 
the proposals miss a chance in declining to expand whistleblowing duties un-
der Rules 1.13 and 4.1. Each of these potential objections will be discussed in 
turn below. 
A. Objections That These Proposals Go Too Far 
1. Creation of Wedge Between Clients and Lawyers 
The conventional rationale for attorney confidentiality insists that clients 
share secrets with their attorneys because they believe their attorneys will nev-
er reveal these secrets to third parties.185 Perhaps clients would not repose trust 
in their attorneys to the same degree if they could not count on that near-
ironclad guarantee of confidentiality.186 Indeed, attorneys might even advise 
clients to refrain from discussing matters that could fall within the scope of 
whistleblowing provisions. The ironic result would be that reforms designed to 
enhance environmental protection would lead clients to shun their lawyers 
when questions arise about compliance with environmental laws.187 
This criticism is overblown. To begin with, clients do not share infor-
mation with lawyers merely to keep it secret. Clients speak to lawyers because 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See infra notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
 184 See infra notes 207–214 and accompanying text. 
 185 D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 769 (“Clearly, if the clients believe that whatever they 
tell their attorneys will be kept in strict confidence, clients will be more encouraged to utilize the ser-
vices of attorneys.”). 
 186 Patrick Casey & Richard Dennison, The Revision of ABA Rule 1.6 and Conflicting Duties of the 
Lawyer to Both the Client and Society, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 569, 574 (2003) (“If the client fears 
that the lawyer may, should, or must disclose client’s confidences and secrets . . . honesty and full candor 
will not be an element of that attorney client relationship.” (quoting Memorandum from David L. Praver, 
Co-Founder and Co-Chair, Ventura Cty. Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm. to ABA Comm’n on 
Evaluation of Rules of Prof’l Conduct (n.d.), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/praver.html [http://perma.cc/5HJZ-TDAS])). 
 187 See id. (“If there is full disclosure, the attorney can counsel the client and perhaps convince the 
client not to pursue the stated course of conduct. Without the confidentiality, the client doesn’t dis-
close and the attorney is removed from the process of counseling the client.” (quoting Memorandum 
from David L. Praver, supra note 186)). 
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they need legal services. In some cases, the confidentiality rules are not neces-
sary for such communication;188 in some cases, the confidentiality rules are not 
sufficient for such communication.189 But in any event, it is naïve to assume 
that lawyers and clients only speak with one another to the extent that the ethi-
cal rules hold the secrecy of their communication inviolate.190 Patients confide 
in doctors and businesspeople confide in accountants even though communica-
tions with such professionals are subject to weaker confidentiality rules than 
communication with lawyers.191 As a general matter, clients will share their 
information with professionals who can provide unique help if clients need that 
help. 
It is also important to bear in mind that lawyers will continue to have 
strong loyalty to clients, due in part to ethical requirements and in part to their 
economic self-interests.192 The amendments proposed in this Article consist 
largely of new exceptions allowing—but not requiring—disclosure and other 
remedial actions under certain circumstances. Lawyers are unlikely to invoke 
these exceptions unless truly urgent circumstances exist. A lawyer inclined to 
invoke a disclosure ground would probably counsel the client to change course 
so that such disclosure is not necessary.193 Greater cognizance of environmen-
tal risks does not necessarily entail disloyalty. 
Finally, the “wedge” theory finds little support in history. Over the last 
three decades, the ABA has gradually expanded the circumstances that might 
necessitate whistleblowing or other precautions in order to avoid harm to third 
                                                                                                                           
 188 DEBORAH L. RHODE ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS 245 (6th ed. 2013) (collecting evidence that some 
categories of clients are candid with lawyers even without the assurance of confidentiality). 
 189 Id. (indicating that some clients are not candid with lawyers even when assured of confidenti-
ality). 
 190 As long as clients need lawyers to accomplish a particular task, and no alternative to consulta-
tion with lawyers will suffice, then clients will need to proceed on the terms that the ABA and state 
bars set for confidentiality. The argument about alienation has arisen in various contexts, but the con-
cern seems less worrisome when there is a continuing need for a lawyer’s assistance. E.g., Tom Lin-
inger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 1201, 1274–75 (2004) (arguing that federal investigators would not cease to interact with federal 
prosecutors even if the prosecutors assumed new ethical duties that officers considered to be a nui-
sance, because consultation with prosecutors would still be necessary to obtain access to certain inves-
tigative tools). 
 191 Ashley Saunders Lipson, Know Your Testimonial Objections, TRIAL, July 2005, at 70, 71–72 
(characterizing attorney-client privilege as very strong, physician-patient privilege as weak, and ac-
countant-client privilege as very weak). 
 192 D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 769–70 (“No practicing attorney would want to scare 
away a client by informing the client that if he tells her certain things she will ‘blow the whistle’ on 
him—if the practicing attorney wants to maximize her own income.”). 
 193 Indeed, the proposed Rule 2.2, discussed in Part II, section B, would require that lawyers 
counsel clients about the need to avoid “imminent, substantial and irremediable harm.” See supra 
notes 104–109 and accompanying text. The proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3), discussed in Part II, section A, 
would allow disclosure of clients’ secret information if they do not desist. See supra notes 94–102 and 
accompanying text. 
110 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:61 
parties.194 This gradual erosion of the partisan paradigm has not estranged cli-
ents from their lawyers. If anything, the growing complexity of the law neces-
sitates greater interaction between lawyers and clients.195 In sum, there is little 
reason to believe that great attention to environmental protection will alienate 
clients from their lawyers. 
2. Polarization of the Bar 
Another possible concern is that the reforms proposed in this Article 
might divide the bar into pro-environment and anti-environment factions. At 
present, it is possible for lawyers to argue in favor of environmental protection 
one day and against environmental protection the next day, so long as lawyers 
are not taking inconsistent positions in the same proceeding or causing harm to 
their clients.196 Because the current ethical rules do not require rigid compart-
mentalization of the bar into ideological factions, attorneys for both sides may 
interact more collegially, may appreciate the work of their opponents more, 
and may take a more holistic view of societal problems such as the need for 
environmental protection. 
How would the amendments proposed in this Article change the fluidity 
of roles in the present system? Lawyers who invoke the whistleblowing provi-
sions may find difficulty working for business clients in the future. Lawyers 
who give uninvited counseling about potential environmental harm may be-
come less popular with certain clients while attracting more progressive clients 
that value such advice. Firms that expand their environmental pro bono work 
might lose clients who find such work objectionable. Some of the more con-
troversial ideas discussed in Part III, including a ban on positional conflicts, 
might segregate the bar based on ideology. The polarization of the bar might be 
harmful because it could heighten acrimony in litigation, reduce the likelihood 
of settlement, and cause lawyers to experience less career satisfaction because 
they would have a narrower range of professional opportunities. It might also 
reduce the total number of environmentally conscious lawyers to a minority of 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text (discussing bar associations’ growing cogni-
zance of obligations to third parties). 
 195 For example, the demand for environmental lawyers has increased steadily throughout the 
period in which the ABA’s ethics code has added new third-party duties. See, e.g., Future Bright for 
Environmental Lawyers, Panel Says, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.law.
virginia.edu/html/news/2008_spr/environ_career.htm [http://perma.cc/9H6R-EWEH]. 
 196 Model Rule 1.7(a) does not allow an attorney to take a position that is directly adversarial to a 
present client, and does not allow an attorney to represent a client when any circumstance creates “a 
significant risk” of material limitation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR. 
ASS’N 2013). Further, Rule 1.7(b) does not allow an attorney to represent two clients simultaneously 
if that representation would entail conflicting duties in the same proceeding. Id. r. 1.7(b); see supra 
notes 145–154 and accompanying text (discussing proposed changes to Model Rule 1.7). 
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the bar, in which case the governing bodies in state bars might decide to roll 
back the reforms advocated in this Article. 
Again, these criticisms are unduly alarmist. Marketing considerations and 
the need for specialization have already led most practitioners of environmen-
tal law to focus on representing one side or the other. Even if the reforms ad-
vocated in this Article caused a greater division of environmental lawyers into 
camps that consistently opposed one another, that result would not necessarily 
be undesirable. Lawyers who play certain roles consistently are generally bet-
ter at those roles. In the criminal justice system, prosecutors and criminal de-
fense attorneys typically practice only one side, but they have collegial rela-
tions, settle a huge number of cases,197 and experience high levels of career 
satisfaction.198 The concern that the reforms suggested in this Article might 
provoke a feud between pro-environment and anti-environment partisans 
seems ironic in that the critics of third-party duties usually extol the value of 
extreme partisanship.199  
3. Snowball Effect Leading to Other Duties for Lawyers 
Critics might argue that while the proposals in Part II are not themselves 
objectionable, they would create a dangerous precedent for saddling lawyers 
with responsibilities to extrinsic interests. Once lawyers have the duty to police 
clients’ environmental harm, why wouldn’t a state bar impose similar duties 
such as policing clients’ inequitable pay for men and women or clients’ failure 
to meet benchmarks for hiring minorities? According to such reasoning, the 
imposition of more duties to serve outside interests would create a slippery 
slope that would eventually cause lawyers to function more as auditors than as 
advocates for their clients. 
This argument is a familiar refrain sounded by various professions that in-
stinctively resist any regulatory changes. In the 1940s, the American Medical 
Association strenuously resisted the early proposals for Medicare and Medi-
caid, contending that any such program would open the door to the eventual 
                                                                                                                           
 197 Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/T4F8-WQF3] (noting that 90% of criminal cases settle without trial). 
 198 A survey of lawyers in four states found that prosecutors and public defenders reported high 
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 199 See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text (discussing the partisan paradigm that has be-
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socialization of medicine. 200 Like doctors in the 1940s, lawyers naturally op-
pose change because their familiar routine is both comfortable and lucrative. 
Another possible objection is that additional duties to the environment 
would lead to a vast amount of future regulation. The recent history of 
amendments to the ABA Model Rules suggests that such a fear is groundless. 
Since the ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983, the ABA has sporadically 
added incremental reforms, but the cumulative effect of these reforms over 
three decades has been fairly innocuous.201 The occasional fine-tuning of the 
Model Rules has not led to their wholesale transformation; it has simply led to 
more fine-tuning every ten years or so.202 
Ironically, lawyers may be more vulnerable to onerous regulation if they 
make no effort to address environmental problems through self-regulation. The 
ABA’s tepid approach to corporate fraud in 2002 provides a cautionary tale. 
The ABA House of Delegates eschewed any amendments to the Model Rules 
that would have imposed substantial whistleblowing duties on lawyers.203 A 
few months later, the highly publicized problems at corporations including En-
ron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, and Tyco led the public to conclude that law-
yers were “sleeping at the switch.”204 Congress responded to this public out-
rage by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, establishing new whistleblowing du-
ties for lawyers and accountants.205 This legislation represented the first major 
incursion by Congress into the heretofore-autonomous realm of lawyers. The 
ABA House of Delegates quickly realized that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a 
shot across the bow. In the summer of 2003, the ABA adopted the stricter 
amendments that the House of Delegates had rejected only a year before.206 
The lesson was clear: if the ABA will not set high enough standards for itself, 
Congress might step in to set those standards. 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Kenneth T. Walsh, The Politics of Medicare and Medicaid, 50 Years Later, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (July 30, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/30/the-
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 201 Supra notes 13, 65 and accompanying text (discussing revisions to the Model Rules). 
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B. Objections That These Proposals Do Not Go Far Enough 
1. Preference for Permissive Rather Than Mandatory Reporting 
Some critics might argue that the reforms proposed in this Article would 
not make enough progress in protecting the environment. For example, critics 
might complain that the proposals settle for permissive, rather than mandatory, 
reporting of imminent environmental harm. According to this perspective, 
lawyers are too partisan to take permissive reporting obligations seriously, and 
a regulatory approach that simply exhorts lawyers to report their clients’ indis-
cretions would never succeed. 
There are several reasons why a hortatory approach is more appropriate. 
The most important is that virtually all of the current disclosure rules are per-
missive.207 If ethical rules mandated disclosure to protect the environment 
while merely permitting disclosure to prevent murder and large-scale financial 
fraud, this incongruity would provoke dissent in the bar and might cause a 
general backlash against environmental duties in the ethics code. Another po-
tential problem is that mandatory disclosure rules might have a chilling effect 
on lawyer-client communication,208 whereas lawyers and clients currently un-
derstand that permissive rules allow space for discretion and permit an oppor-
tunity for lawyers to urge self-reporting by clients. Finally, rules that mandate 
disclosure are easy to circumvent, because the outside world rarely has access 
to the information that a lawyer obtains from a client. Due to the difficulty of 
enforcement, the practical reality is that a mandatory rule probably would not 
result in more disclosure than a permissive rule. 
2. Failure to Propose Reforms of Rules 1.13 and 4.1 
This Article has not suggested any reforms to Rule 1.13, which prescribes 
whistleblowing duties for lawyers representing organizational clients, or Rule 
4.1, which requires candor in negotiations under certain circumstances. Critics 
might argue that amendments to these two rules are necessary in order to pro-
mote environmental protection. 
Why not amend Rule 1.13 so that it incorporates obligations to promote 
environmental health? The simple answer is that Rule 1.13 has never included 
any duties to outside entities. Rule 1.13 obligates attorneys to protect their cli-
ents from “outsiders” (i.e., the constituents who work for, but are distinct from, 
the organizational clients), rather than protecting outsiders from clients.209 The 
current version of Rule 1.13 does address violations of environmental law that 
                                                                                                                           
 207 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b). 
 208 Casey & Dennison, supra note 186, at 574. 
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could redound to the detriment of the organizational client,210 but any exten-
sion of that language to value the environment intrinsically would be incon-
sistent with the role that Rule 1.13 has played since its inception. The rules that 
protect outsiders from clients are Rules 1.6 and 4.4—rules that the above-listed 
proposals would amend.211 
Relatedly, there are several reasons why this Article has not proposed to 
amend Rule 4.1, which requires truthfulness in statements to others. First, the 
current version of Rule 4.1 already requires candor as to material representa-
tions, and materiality depends on the extent of reliance,212 so the audience can 
dial up the materiality standard by announcing an intention to rely heavily on a 
lawyer’s representations concerning environmental matters. Second, formal 
discovery is available when verification of claims about the environment 
seems important. Third, this Article has proposed amending the rule governing 
candor in evaluations for use by third parties,213 so one solution for dubious 
candor in negotiations would be to request such an evaluation. Fourth, negotia-
tions in litigation must culminate in the presentation of a settlement to the 
court, at which point a heightened obligation of candor will apply,214 so law-
yers have an incentive to make careful representations in negotiating a settle-
ment of a lawsuit. Finally, enforcement of Rule 4.1 is difficult because it is 
hard to establish the information that a lawyer has at the time of a particular 
negotiation, so this Article would not necessarily improve environmental pro-
tection by proposing to tighten the requirements under Rule 4.1. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers should join other professions in assuming ethical duties to pro-
tect the environment. This Article has offered proposals for amendments that 
would fit well within the current framework of the ABA Model Rules for Pro-
fessional Conduct and their state analogs. This Article has also considered ide-
as for more radical reforms that are not presently ready for adoption, but that 
deserve further consideration. 
Some readers might believe that lawyers’ historical partisanship cannot 
abide the addition of new duties to promote environmental health. Such an ob-
jection underestimates the extent to which the rules of legal ethics have already 
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begun to address considerations extrinsic to the lawyer-client relationship. So 
far those extrinsic matters have generally related to human interests, but the 
environment now deserves inclusion on this list. 
With the adoption of the ethical rules proposed in this Article, lawyers can 
be powerful allies in the campaign to reduce environmental degradation. This 
is not an endeavor that lawyers should watch from the sidelines. The ethics 
code for lawyers should not lag behind the codes for doctors, engineers, busi-
nesspeople, and other professionals who have realized the moral duty to pro-
tect the environment. 
The purpose of an ethics code is to ensure that practitioners attend to is-
sues of transcendent importance—issues that practitioners might neglect if 
they focused narrowly on their day-to-day tasks. Scientists have informed us 
that environmental protection is one of the most urgent challenges facing hu-
manity today. It should not be a distraction from lawyers’ ordinary ethical du-
ties; it should be a central part of those duties. 
  
 
